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Abstract
Restitution of Nazi-looted art in the United States is a complicated legal and policy issue.
Victims and their heirs seeking restitution of their stolen art frequently encounter inconsistent
legal standards at the state, federal, and international levels. Moreover, there are many different
parties involved in these cases, including countries, museums, private collections, auction
houses, heirs, and individuals who may have an interest in the particular work of art. Ethics must
also be considered, and in the past, international principles for nations have been established to
guide the process of delivering victims of wartime looting justice. Unfortunately, the current
legal framework has failed to accomplish this goal.
Through textual analysis of six different cases of Nazi-looted art in United States courts,
this thesis reveals patterns that demonstrate the shortcomings and strengths of the adjudication
process designed to facilitate Holocaust-era asset return. Differing statutes of limitation, choice
of law, and the rhetoric involved in the 2016 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act are
among the most important issues explored. In order to overcome the glaring obstacles posed by
statutes of limitations and mitigate the weaknesses of the HEAR Act, it is recommended that
time restraints must be abolished entirely with respect to Nazi-looted art claims, and laches
defenses must be prohibited.
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“You cannot mend this house or this family. You can mark some of the broken
places. You can mark them properly and with dignity, with love. And then move
away again, let the house be.”
- Edmund de Waal, Letters to Camondo
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Introduction

6

The Camondo family established themselves as one of the most powerful banking
families in Europe after building a network in multiple capital European cities. Following their
expulsion from Spain, the family traveled to Mediterranean cities and began building their
empire. Abraham de Camondo financed a great deal of trade within the Ottoman Empire and
amassed a wealth of approximately 125 million francs.1 The family then moved to France to
transfer the business and establish a European headquarters in 1863. After Abraham’s death, his
son, Moise de Camondo, inherited the business, but unfortunately lacked skill in the trade. He
was more interested in collecting art and took it upon himself to renovate the family’s 17th
arrondissement mansion to reflect this refined and esteemed taste. The mansion reflected his
financial affluence, including fine works of 18th-century French art, porcelain, silver dinnerware,
furniture, and more. Items designed by acclaimed furniture maker Georges Jacob, cabinetmaker
Jean-Francois Oeben (the carpenter of Madame de Pompadour herself), and silversmith Jacques
Nicolas Roettiers littered the fantastic neoclassical estate.2 Moise’s obsession with collecting art
never faded, and he left his daughter Béatrice with the responsibility of carrying out specific
instructions on what to do with these artworks upon his death in 1935. He clarified that she was
not to loan out any of the pieces, and she was forbidden from adding to the collection. She was
also not allowed to move any of the furniture or paintings from their set locations within the
house. These were his wishes, and since the house luckily fell into the hands of the French
government in 1936, prior to the Nazi takeover of the city, it became a museum of the Musée des
Art Décoratifs. Béatrice however, did not meet the same fate as Moise’s prized collection.

1

Derman, Ushi. “House of Camondo: The Story of a Jewish Aristocratic Family Who Died in Auschwitz.” Museum
of the Jewish People (blog), April 11, 2021. https://www.anumuseum.org.il/blog-items/house-camondo-storyjewish-aristocratic-family-died-auschwitz/.
2
Derman.
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Béatrice remained in Paris during the Nazi occupation with her two children from her
then-divorced husband, Jewish musician Leon Reinach. She had believed her status and
experiences hunting with the military leader and Nazi art fanatic Hermann Goering himself
would prevent her from facing the same discrimination and tragic fate of her fellow Jews within
the city.3 She was, of course, very wrong in this assumption. On November 20, 1943, her exhusband and two children were sent to Auschwitz, and Béatrice followed on March 4, 1944. And
so was the end of the Camondo family line, but their house remains at 63 de Monceau Street,
reminding visitors of the intrinsic and emotional value certain objects can hold, and how their
preservation represents far more than one may initially assume. The story of the Camondo family
exemplifies what happens when familial possessions are properly preserved. Memories live on,
and despite all they endured and their tragic end, the family name lives on.
International conflict, war, and genocide disturb more than just the lives of those who
directly endure the events as they transpire. Those that suffer such tragedies endure permanent
physical and emotional scars and must contend with damaged identity, stolen property, and lost
culture. World War II witnessed one of the most comprehensive efforts in history to exterminate
an entire race, and with this race, their culture. As part of this effort, the Nazis confiscated a wide
range of valuable items from the Jews, including real estate, investments, mobile assets, and
countless works of art. These works of art were taken by both Nazi organizations and individual
Nazi officials for their own personal collections. These different groups and individuals
systematically took the objects from national museums, acclaimed collectors, and even off the
walls of private homes. Because of the effort, resources, time, and importance the Nazis placed

3

Laskin, David. “The History and Heartbreak of Paris’s Camondo Museum.” Hadassah Magazine, December 15,
2016. https://www.hadassahmagazine.org/2016/12/15/history-heartbreak-paris-museum/.
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on this particular instance of wartime looting, this issue is one that cannot be ignored. Instances
of Nazi looting have presented a plethora of ethical and legal challenges in the art world that
continue to frustrate lawmakers today. Jewish victims of Nazi looting seeking restitution of their
property encounter inconsistent guidance and legal frameworks in attempting to repossess the
objects from galleries, museums, and private collections.
Global efforts have been made to facilitate the process of restituting stolen art, but within
the United States, policies have changed according to public opinion on the issues at different
times since the end of the war. The United States has struggled to maintain a clear-cut policy on
restitution and recovering personal property for the past 70 years, resulting in a confusing,
inconsistent grab-bag of laws that raise crucial questions. These questions include, but are
certainly not limited to, which courts have the power to hear these kinds of disputes, whether or
not the U.S. state or federal court can compel a foreign nation or defendant to defend themselves
in a domestic or foreign court, along with issues of diplomacy and foreign relations.
This thesis will examine the history behind this historic plundering of Europe’s cultural
assets, analyze and mark cases that have made their way through the United States courts, and
propose solutions to ensure victims of Nazi looting receive fair and just resolution and
compensation for their losses. Chapter 1 will provide readers with an extensive historical
background on the looting operations carried out by the Nazis, along with a discussion of the
aftermath of the plundering dealt with by countries around the globe. This historical context is
imperative in contextualizing the scope of the emotional, financial, and cultural impacts that the
phenomenon of Nazi looting had on victims.
Chapter 2 will provide a comprehensive analysis of relevant cases that have been
adjudicated within the United States court system over the past 70 years. Landmark cases

9

illustrate the unique circumstances under which cases arise, and these particular examples
highlight a variety of issues in terms of how the courts have gone about adjudication. Other cases
analyzed will demonstrate instances when the United States courts failed to provide victims of
looting with adequate compensation for their losses. These cases also illustrate situations during
which the courts failed to adhere to predetermined principles detailed in Chapter 1. Next, there
will be an analysis of a singular instance of justice provided to a victim of Nazi looting through
court settlement in the United States.
Chapter 3 will then summarize tangible ways to improve the adjudication process,
reuniting victims of Nazi looting with their property. This section will examine specific sections
of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016 and suggest alterations to ensure just
outcomes. Additionally, a new international agreement similar in structure to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization will be proposed.
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Chapter 1.
The Issue of Restitution Claims in Relation to NaziLooted Art: Historical Overview

11

Art as a medium of expression and a representation of cultural identities has traditionally
been an object of desire, subject to theft, trafficking, and trading throughout history. When
countries are thrown into turbulent times of war and groups of people are displaced from their
home countries, their possessions are often seized. These works are traded, kept for personal
collections, or placed in museum collections, never being reunited with their original, rightful
owners. The field of restitution of looted works has proven to be extremely problematic,
involving enormous amounts of money and the tendency for emotions to run high. Art claims are
traditionally symbolic to the claimants, and they often ask that the object in question be returned.
However, gray areas regarding forced sales of works sold under duress, and differing statutes of
limitations among countries and states serve to further obscure matters, especially concerning
Nazi-looted art from World War II.
The 2005 United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law defines restitution “as also encompassing dignity,
worth, identity, and family.”4 Efforts to restitute works of art or cultural property are difficult to
resolve in that the ownership history, or provenance of a work cannot always be easily
determined due to ambiguous information, or a lack of available information in general. There is
no shortage of players involved in the issues, for auction houses, artists, museums, and private
collectors all may contribute to determining the ultimate disposition of a piece. Additionally,
these organizations sometimes unknowingly participate in the illegal trading of objects. Stolen
objects, ranging from oil paintings to silverware, china, and more, often end up far from their

4

Thérèse, O’Donnell. “Restitution of Holocaust Looted Art and Transitional Justice: The Perfect Storm or the Raft
of the Medusa?” European Journal of International Law 22, no. 1 (February 1, 2011): 49–80.
https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chr004.
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owners or countries of origin as a result of wartime spoliation and pillaging. Some objects
remain in collections with undetermined provenance when they were stolen or wrongfully
acquired by the institution without any regard for the culture or family that the object came from
and legally belonged to. There has traditionally been a sharp divide between moral obligations
and legal duties when it comes to restituting looted works, and there is little uniformity across
international and national regulations regarding such matters.
Hitler’s Organized Art Theft
To understand the scope of the issue at hand when it comes to the repatriation of World
War II-era assets, one must know the extent to which the Nazi Party went to seize art from all
across Europe. Hitler’s organized art theft that lasted the duration of World War II has fascinated
legal scholars, art historians, Holocaust survivors, and many others across the globe for the sheer
magnitude of works the Nazis were able to seize from their owners. With renewed interest in
restituting Holocaust-era assets and the fact that works of art are still being recovered today,
survivors of the Holocaust and their heirs continue to battle with museums, foreign nations, and
sometimes even their own family members for what was taken from them decades ago. There are
paintings that have resurfaced that no one disputes were stolen by the Nazis, and yet, there tends
to be little to no effort to return these works because of the muddled guidance governing such
matters. The issue is one of global significance, as the items of concern are movable, personal
property with heirs spanning from Europe to the United States, and each country involved takes a
different approach to dispute resolutions concerning the substantive laws of property. The case of
Nazi-looted art is particularly disturbing because of the sizeable effort of the Third Reich to strip
German Jews and other minority groups of any and all rights. Art was at the forefront of the Nazi
worldview, and the targeting of art and art collections “was at the top of the Nazi’s to-do list
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upon assuming the authority of a sovereign nation.”5 The National Socialists saw art as a means
of promoting both their party’s cultural values of cleansing the European art historical canon and
as a way to proclaim their own, individual status as well-rounded, intellectually stimulated men.
The Nazi spoliation of art was also deeply personal for the generals that undertook such efforts,
along with the victims they stole from and artists they either supported or condemned. The Nazi
State’s assault against the Jews of Europe and their property consisted of the systematic takeover
of their real and tangible property and a transformation of their property holdings into essential
objects for the perpetrators’ own use.
The Nazis began to strip German Jews of rights prior to the enactment of the 1935
Nuremberg Laws, and various operations that served the sole purpose of art-looting, of course
under the guise of either denying enemy materials or preserving culture for scientific purposes,
were implemented as Nazi regime policy. Even before Kristallnacht, the Nazi government
enacted, on April 26, 1938, the Ordinance for the Registration of Jewish Property (the
Registration Ordinance), the Ordinance for the Attachment of the Property of the Peoples’ and
State’s Enemies on November 20, 1938, and the Ordinance for the Employment of Jewish
Property on December 3, 1938. The Registration Ordinance gave German and Austrian officials
a list of where to look for cultural property, along with whom exactly to pressure.6
By the time Germany began to invade other countries, the Nazis had a system of looting
art and cultural property in place that featured multiple layers, different governmental branches,
and various officials to lead each force. The Kunstschutz, led by Count Franz Wolff-Metternich,
was the governmental branch charged with supervising the confiscation of art specifically in

5

Nicholas M. O’Donnell, A Tragic Fate: Law and Ethics in the Battle Over Nazi-Looted Art (Chicago, Illinois:
Ankerwycke, 2017), 51.
6
O’Donnell, 6.
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Nazi-occupied France. This branch of government took its orders from the Wehrmacht, or the
German Embassy in Paris, which subsequently took its orders from the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Founded on May 11, 1940, during the Military offensive in France, the organization was
responsible for compiling a list of artworks located in the war zone and protecting them in the
name of the army of occupation and in conformity with international agreements.7 Abetz
conceived the idea of official pillage of art, suggesting to Foreign Affairs Minister von
Ribbentrop that he take several works into the possession of the Reich as “prepayment and
advance for war reparations.”8 Abetz is an example of a Nazi officer who kept plundered works
either at the embassy or sent them to von Ribbentrop’s home in Berlin along with other ministry
offices, under the guise of “pre-payments” and safekeeping or supervision purposes. Some Jews,
as of September 1940, were even under the impression that they were temporarily donating their
art collections to the French government to protect them after the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter
Rosenberg (ERR) was given the instructions to confiscate precious objects and transport them to
Germany.9 Members of Himmler’s Security Police, which united the criminal police (Kripo) and
the political police (Gestapo) of the Third Reich, also contributed to the looting of cultural
objects throughout Europe.10
The ERR was formally created on July 17, 1940, as a result of the professed “ideological
objective” of members of Nazi leadership to collect, or rather confiscate, cultural holdings of
Jews and other groups despised by the Third Reich. The organization was originally tasked with

7

Hector Feliciano, The Lost Museum: The Nazi Conspiracy to Steal the World’s Greatest Works of Art
(BasicBooks, 1995), 34.
8
Feliciano, 34.
9
Feliciano, 35.
10
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “The Security Police (SiPo),” in Holocaust Encyclopedia, November
30, 2021, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/the-security-police-sipo.
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organizing seizures of archives and libraries in occupied countries as part of the Nazi mission to
“battle Judaism and Freemasonry.”11 Alfred Rosenberg, the Nazi party ideologue, served as the
original, sole head of the ERR, and the organization operated closely with the Wehrmacht and
Security Police in occupied territories.12 Prior to the creation of the ERR, a note signed by
General Wilhelm Keitel, German Army Chief of Staff in Berlin, to General von Boeckelberg,
German Military Commander of the city of Paris, specified that “the Führer, in response to a
report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave an order that, excluding those belonging to the
French State, all art objects and historic documents belonging to individuals, and Jews in
particular, are to be put into safekeeping.”13 These objects were put under the supervision of the
German Embassy rather than appropriated. A rapid series of confiscations followed the 1940
establishment of the ERR. These confiscations taking place between July and September were
spearheaded by Ambassador Otto Abetz, who conceived the idea of official pillaging, and his
staff. In undertaking such an expansive looting effort, the Nazis unintentionally preserved and
provided a detailed picture of all their looting activities and the effects they had.14
Government-sponsored initiatives to seize art were not limited to group efforts. Nazi
Party leaders, including Hitler himself, stole art for their own personal collections. Hermann
Goering, minister-president of Prussia and Minister of the Interior beginning in 1933, also gained
considerable power and became one of the leading Nazi officers involved in the looting of art for
his own personal advantage. In 1936, he assumed the role of plenipotentiary minister of

11

Feliciano, 33.
Martin Dean, “Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg: A Policy of Plunder,” in United States Holocaust Memorial
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Germany’s economic and industrial “Four Year Plan,"15 earning him a considerable fortune in
armament production that he chose to spend on broadening his impressive and illegally amassed
art collection. Goering began to use the ERR to meet his own personal ends in the fall of 1940.
He utilized private trains, Luftwaffe personnel, and logistical advantages that he could place at
the ERR’s disposal for his personal collecting efforts.16 In November of 1940, Hitler ordered that
all confiscated art be transported to Germany so that it could be at his personal disposal. The
works would later fall under the control of Hans Posse, who was then the director of the Dresden
Museum and Hitler’s planned “Führer Museum.”17 However, because of Goering’s conflicting
interests in the matter, the order was never executed. By the beginning of the war in 1939,
Goering’s collection consisted of around 200 of the world’s finest pieces of art, and by the end of
the war, it grew to 1,375 paintings, 250 sculptures, 108 tapestries, 200 pieces of period furniture,
60 Persian and French rugs, 75 stained glass windows and 175 other miscellaneous art objects.18
Beginning in 1940, additional laws were passed to justify seizing Jewish property, along
with property belonging to French Resistance fighters who had fled the country. The Vichy
government created the Service de Contrôle des Administrateurs Provisoires (SCAP, or
Provisional Administrators Supervisory Board) to confiscate and manage the Aryanization of
Jewish Businesses. The SCAP was limited to isolating those buildings that belonged to Jewish
art dealers and collectors. In an attempt that came too late, the General Commissariat on Jewish
Affairs (GCJA) was created to recoup the art collections and paintings already confiscated from
French Jews by the Germans. However, this organization was unsuccessful, and other branches

15

Feliciano, 32.
Feliciano, 36.
17
Feliciano, 38.
18
Kenneth D. Alford, Nazi Plunder; Great Treasure Stories of World War II (De Capo Press, 2001), 28.
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of the Vichy government including the Direction des Domaines (State Property Department) and
the Direction des Musées de France (French Museums Administration) were interested in the
confiscated Jewish collections, Unfortunately, due to German confiscation efforts the GCJA’s
objections were insufficient.19
Initial Confrontation of the Restitution Issue: The Immediate Post-War Era
States have adopted regulations regarding restitution since the second half of the
twentieth century following the mass spoliation carried out by the Nazis during World War II.
The Allied States, and the United States, in particular, put great energy and effort into the
restitution of stolen art in the years following the war. Legal principles were established in order
to attempt to determine who could bring a claim forward in such a dispute, and who held the
presumptive right to restitution of thousands of dislocated objects.20 However, these principles
were just loose moral guidelines that provided countries with suggestions on how to go about
restituting Nazi-looted art, not taking into account the extensive differing circumstances in which
these cases could arise.
The 1954 Hague Convention, the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention, European Council Conventions and Recommendations, UN General Assembly, and
Security Council resolutions intended to repair the damages caused by the destruction and
looting of cultural property as the result of armed conflicts as well as during peacetime. The
European Union and the Council of Europe also adopted multiple frameworks to address the
illicit trafficking of cultural property and the issue of wrongfully taken cultural objects. These
international frameworks have been somewhat effective in providing loose moral and legal

19
20

Feliciano, 39.
O’Donnell.
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guidelines for participating States, but problems arise in the State's enforcement of such rules.
There is an absence of national laws that render established international principles applicable in
the domestic legal systems of participating States. Guidelines on the issues tend to be theoretical
in nature rather than setting forth a legally binding protocol for States to agree to follow when
restitution cases arise. This has resulted in States, museums, galleries, auction houses, and
private collectors facing restitution claims from victims of plundering and their heirs directly.
Following the halt of the German advance on the Soviet Union on January 5, 1943, the
government of the United Kingdom issued the Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of
Dispossession Committed in Territories under Enemy Occupation and Control. Since then, the
declaration has been referred to as the London Declaration and features participation from
sixteen nations in addition to the United Kingdom: Belgium, Canada, China, the Czechoslovak
Republic, the French National Committee, Greece, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Soviet Union, the Union of South Africa, the United States,
Australia, and Yugoslavia. The declaration recognized the systematic spoliation of occupied
countries that the Nazis carried out whilst in power, and made it its aim to assess the state of
affairs, and “declare invalid any transfers of or dealings with, property, rights, and interests of
any description whatsoever which are, or have been, situated in the territories which have come
under the occupation or control, direct or indirect of the Governments with which they are at
war, or which belong, or have belonged to persons (including juridical persons) resident in such
territories.”21
Following this declaration, the United States and the United Kingdom adopted a series of
military government laws. One of these operations, referred to as Military Government Law No.

21

O’Donnell, 8.
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59 (MGL No. 59) was titled “Restitution of Identifiable Property” and was at odds with
traditional civil law of many European countries prior to this point in time:
Property shall be restored to its former owner or to his successor in interest in accordance
with the provision of this Law even though the interests of other persons who had no
knowledge of the wrongful taking must be subordinated.22

The law defines confiscated property as that which was “not conveyed in good faith, under
duress, or otherwise unlawful taking; seized by government act or in abuse of a government act;
or seized as a result of measures taken by the Nazis.”23 The law is expansive in its treatment of
rights to be vindicated, as the dissolved entities’ rights can be enforced either by individual
members of the organization or by a judicially appointed representative.24
Even before the official end of the war, the United States also established a Monuments,
Fine Arts, and Archives Section program (MFAA), which was charged with the immense
responsibility of dealing with the extensive German-controlled warehouses of objects across
Europe. The MFAA examined each object and oversaw interrogations of museum professionals
and art historians who were in charge of Nazi cultural institutions and looting operations. Objects
discovered through this operation were to be returned to their countries of origin for those
governments to restitute to their owners, as the MFAA did not undertake the responsibility of
locating the looted objects’ individual owners. It has since been argued by litigants that this
policy decision meant that individual claimants have no right to restitution, despite MGL Law
No. 59 stating otherwise.25 Other countries also took notable steps before the end of the war. For

O’Donnell, 25.
O’Donnell, 8.
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O’Donnell, 9.
25
O’Donnell, 10.
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example, in 1941 the Luxembourg government enacted a law that declared all forced sales of art
during the war null and void.26
In 1945, President Harry S. Truman approved an external restitution policy at the
Potsdam Conference between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, and the President himself. The meeting, following the German surrender in May,
continued discussions concerning the post-war reconstruction of Europe. This included
determining how the Allies would restore objects to the countries from which they had been
taken, and the policy decided upon enabled countries to “handle restoration of property to
owners ‘in whatever way they see fit.’”27 This effort emphasized restitution for the victims of
plundering, but these attempts proved to be unsuccessful resulting in many works ending up on
the U.S. art market, or in American Museums and private collections.28
The Nuremberg Trials of 1946 and 1947 also played a notable role in the judicial
developments of the modern age, laying out the wickedness of the crimes committed by
surviving Nazi officials and German generals and trying these individuals for their offenses
committed during the war. The trials demonstrated and clarified the rapidity and harshness of
Nazi oppression from 1933 onward. The trials also revealed the Nazi’s art looting methods, and
thus exposed their highly methodical practices and operations. Additionally, the trials saw the
recognition of Nazi Germany as a sovereign state, giving no deference or immunity on that
traditional basis.29
The Washington Conference and Other Conventions: the 1990s to Present

26

O’Donnell, 41.
Thomas R Kline and L Eden Burgess, “Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress e. Engel and j. Nadler and
Former Members of Congress m. Levine and r. Wexler Supporting Reversal of the Order Granting Summary
Judgment,” n.d., 30.
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Throughout the 1990s, there was a resurgence of efforts to clarify the guidance
concerning Nazi-looted art and restitution claims regarding these works. This was sparked by the
publishing of a number of books, and certain claims being brought forward publicly with
substantial coverage from the press. Books published around this time, like Jonathan
Petropoulos’s 1996 Art and Politics in the Third Reich and Lynn Nicholas’s The Rape of
Europa: The Fate of Europe's Treasures in the Third Reich and World War II from 1994,
revived awareness of and interest in the issue, and this momentum saw nations gathering to
answer lingering and pertinent questions that they previously avoided. In an attempt to do so,
nations were met with inconsistencies in enforcement. Domestically, museum associations in the
United States were lacking ethical rules for member institutions and also lacked legal
enforcement when it came to matters of stolen art or art of questionable provenance. The
resurgence of interest, after a lull in efforts towards restitution of World War II-era assets, serves
as proof that the matter is like a pendulum because at any given period, “the momentum is likely
to have swung dramatically opposite to what occurred just a few years before,” causing courts to
take an increasingly nuanced view.30
Policy developments of the 1990s were preceded by other efforts to reignite interest in
lost Holocaust-era assets. The Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD) issued a forwardlooking report on June 4, 1998, after convening a Task Force on the Spoliation of Art During the
Nazi/World War II Era. The report considered the role of American museums in the post-war
restitution of art and prioritized the creation of informational resources. This report, like others
that followed, was based on the principle that “each claim presents a unique situation which must

30

O’Donnell, 46.
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be thoroughly reviewed on a case-by-case basis.”31 The report also called for action through the
declaration of three standards. The first stated that each member of the AAMD, as part of
standard research on each work of art in its collection, should begin “immediately to review the
provenance of works in their collections to attempt to ascertain whether any were unlawfully
confiscated during the Nazi/World War II era and never restituted.”32 The second called upon
museums to search their own records thoroughly, “taking steps to contact established archives,
databases, art dealers, auction houses, donors, art historians and other scholars and researchers”33
who could possibly have information on the provenance of Nazi and World War II era works.
The third recognized that this kind of specified provenance research could take years to
complete, and “may be inconclusive and may require additional funding.”34 The principles, like
others issued afterward, were entirely based on the good faith of those attempting to adhere to
them. Although the principles and their effectiveness are considerably difficult to measure, small
and large museums alike spent time identifying objects in their collections that could have been
of potential concern in terms of their provenance. Provenance information at this point in time
was far from standardized, and not computerized, thus previous owners would check their
records by hand against MFAA reports, the Art Loss Register (ALR), and individual collections
that were known to have been targeted by the Nazis.35
Congress enacted two laws in 1998 with the intention of assisting Holocaust victims in
recovering their property. The Holocaust Victims Redress Act (HVRA) and the Holocaust Assets
Commission Act (HACA), along with an allotted $5 million for archival research into restitution
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assets, contributed to the country’s good faith efforts to facilitate the movements started before
the end of the war. HACA established the Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust
Assets, a task force charged with “issuing recommendations for promoting research, education,
and legislation to aid restitution efforts.”36 These acts confronted the fact that previous efforts did
not fully consider the complexity of restituting assets to Holocaust victims. The Commission's
December 2000 Report stressed that in an effort to combat these shortcomings, the President
should “urge Congress to pass legislation that removes impediments to the identification and
restitution of Holocaust victims’ assets.”37
In late 1998, the U.S. Department of State hosted the Washington Conference on
Holocaust-Era Assets in order to continue to promote the principle of equitable38 restitution that
the two aforementioned laws had at their core. Over 40 nations were represented at the
conference, led by Judge Abner Mikva. The imperatives of the conference were “(1) the pursuit
of justice, even if relative; (2) openness and full access to archives and records; (3) the obligation
to seek truth; (4) the urgency created by the passage of time; and (5)... a ‘twin purpose’ to ‘forge
a common approach to the issues still surrounding Holocaust assets,’ and ‘to advance Holocaust
education, remembrance and research.’”39
Each country at the conference had a representative issue a statement or submission to
detail their own proceedings when it came to restitution of Holocaust-era assets. The conference
resulted in the distribution of eleven general principles that were not intended to serve as a

36

O’Donnell, 23.
Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets in the United States, Plunder and Restitution: The U.S.
and Holocaust Victims' Assets SR-142 (Dec. 2000).
38
LII / Legal Information Institute. “Equity.” Accessed February 16, 2022.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/equity. "Equity" or “equitable” in this case refers to a particular set of remedies
and associated procedures involved with civil law. These equitable doctrines and procedures are distinguished from
"legal" ones.
39
O’Donnell, 46.
37

24

solution, according to the conference organizer and then U.S. Under Secretary of State for
Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, Stuart Eizenstat. Eizenstat stated that the
principles were instead a “means by which nations can fashion their own solutions consistent
with their own legal systems…” intended to “capture the spirit of this Conference for nations to
use in this task.”40 The World Jewish Restitution Organization (WJRO) also issued a statement at
this conference. The organization, established in 1992, specifically requested legislation
concerning communal and public property that belonged to Polish Jews before the German
invasion on September 1, 1939.41 Conclusively, the conference resulted in the adoption of ten,
non-binding principles that are as follows:
1. In developing a consensus on non-binding principles to assist in resolving issues
relating to Nazi-confiscated art, the Conference recognizes that among
participating nations there are differing legal systems and that countries act within
the context of their own laws.
2. Art that had been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted should
be identified.
3. Relevant records and archives should be open and accessible to researchers, in
accordance with the guidelines of the International Council on Archives.
4. Resources and personnel should be made available to facilitate the identification
of all art that had been confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted.
5. In establishing that a work of art had been confiscated by the Nazis and not
subsequently restituted, consideration should be given to unavoidable gaps or
ambiguities in the provenance in light of the passage of time and the
circumstances of the Holocaust era.
6. Every effort should be made to publicize art that is found to have been confiscated
by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted in order to locate its pre-War owners
or their heirs.
7. Efforts should be made to establish a central registry of such information.
8. Pre-War owners and their heirs should be encouraged to come forward and make
known their claims to art that was confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently
restituted.
9. If the pre-War owners of art that is found to have been confiscated by the Nazis
and not subsequently restituted, or their heirs, can be identified, steps should be
taken expeditiously to achieve a just and fair solution, recognizing this may vary
according to the facts and circumstances surrounding a specific case.
40
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10. If the pre-War owners of art that is found to have been confiscated by the Nazis,
or their heirs, cannot be identified, steps should be taken expeditiously to achieve
a just and fair solution.
11. Commissions or other bodies established to identify art that was confiscated by
the Nazis and to assist in addressing ownership issues should have a balanced
membership.
12. Nations are encouraged to develop national processes to implement these
principles, particularly as they relate to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
for resolving ownership issues.42

Then deputy general director of the Bavarian State Painting Collection, Prof. Dr. Carla
Shulz-Hoffmann, stated that a desired outcome of the conference was to strengthen collective
efforts to clarify museum provenances for works that came to their collections after 1937 through
the present day.43 Other countries that issued notable statements at the conference included
Austria, whose government established a commission for provenance research, along with an
independent commission of historians to study all aspects of Aryanization and the country’s
restitution efforts regarding victims of the Nazi-era after the war. Additionally, a commission
started by the French government, the Musée Nationaux Récupération (MNR), issued a
straightforward condemnation of the plunderers, stating “clearly, we do not protect any
institution or organization or corporation, but only the victims.”44 The eighth and ninth principles
of the Washington Conference commended France’s display on the internet of unclaimed art
restituted to France by Allied Military authorities, for this kind of transparency was an aim of the
conference. Russia and Hungary also notably serve as examples of countries that consider
restitution a non-issue, or not particularly pressing. Nazi-looted objects were identified, but “the
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return of these objects…” was blocked “by the Russian attitude of indifference towards
international norms on restitution and also by the uncertain situation of their restitution law.”45
Following the Washington Conference, international conventions further emphasized the
aforementioned principles and affirmed the position of the United States as a global leader in
advancing them. The 2000 Vilnius International Forum on Holocaust-Era Looted Cultural
Assets, attended by 38 countries including the United States, saw participating countries agree to
take “reasonable measures” to implement the principles of the Washington Conference and
promote domestic legislation that would assist in identifying and returning Nazi-looted cultural
assets.46 This promise was, again, non-binding in nature.
Current Policies and Practices
Within domestic, United States law, common issues when considering restitution claims
filed in court are often related to the statute of limitations upon which these claims are based.
Typically, the statute of limitations requires that property restitution claims be brought to court
within three years after they materialize, creating an insurmountable problem with works of art
that are discovered nearly 80 years after the end of World War II. One of the principal problems
the courts face is determining at what point a claim accrued, and at what point the limitations
period began running because of the long interval between the artwork’s wartime loss and the
filing of the claim in court.47 Of the twenty Nazi-looted art restitution cases that have been
brought to United States courts, few were settled without resorting to litigation, and these cases
often occurred as claims against public museums, claims against private collectors, and claims
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against foreign states.48 The complexity of the cases has much to do with the passage of time
since the works of art and cultural objects were plundered. Because litigation has been so
delayed, claims in cases often consist of long, convoluted narratives involving dispossessed
families, unsuccessful postwar restitution proceedings, missing artworks changing hands in
several countries, and works disappearing and reemerging, with heirs learning decades later of
claims which they were previously unaware of.49 Multiple levels of government and jurisdictions
are involved in confronting such claims, creating a patchwork of state, federal, and national laws
- ranging from American common law to statutory law, constitutional law, public and private
international law, to the laws of relevant European countries.
In 2002, the California legislature extended the statute of limitations for Nazi-era art
claims against museums and galleries. The law was challenged in an effort to provide a
“reasonable opportunity to commence an action in court” for Holocaust “victims and
descendants [who] are investigating the whereabouts of artwork that rightfully belonged to their
families.”50 However, in 2008, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the California statute was not
preempted by the Executive Branch’s policy of external restitution during Marei Von Saher v.
Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena.51 Marei von Saher, heir of the Jewish art dealer
Jacques Goustikker, brought a claim against the Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena under
California statute, which allowed art owners or their heirs to bring actions against museums to
recover art looted by Nazis. She sought the return of two paintings alleged to have been looted
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by Nazis during World War II, but the Ninth Circuit relied on the act of state doctrine, calling for
U.S. courts to defer to the official acts of foreign sovereigns.
Judge David R. Thompson held that although Saher brought the claim under the
California Code of Civil Procedure, which extended the statute of limitations until 2010 for
actions for the recovery of Holocaust-era art, the appeal infringed on the national government’s
exclusive foreign affairs powers.52 The von Saher case was the first instance in American
jurisprudence of a District Court ruling that a Nazi art looter acquired title to paintings received
through a forced sale. The District Court had decided the case under Dutch law, highlighting a
primary issue with these cases, namely the need to consider the laws of multiple governments.
Current U.S. policy rules that Holocaust-era restitution follows the presumption that any alleged
sale or transfer of property that occurred involving a firm or persecuted individual in Nazioccupied territory from the period of World War II was wrongful and should be considered null
and void in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In 2016, Congress signed the Holocaust
Expropriated Art Recovery Act (HEAR Act) into law, which reflects Congress’s newly
developed understanding of the unique and complex challenges posed by Holocaust art recovery
claims more than 70 years after the end of the war. The act created a federal statute of
limitations, six years from the actual discovery of the artworks’ history and whereabouts, in
order to facilitate the resolution of such claims on the merits, rather than on the basis of
timeliness.53
In 2017, the Justice for Uncompensated Survivors Today (JUST) Act was introduced as a
follow-up to the HEAR Act. JUST called for the State Department to monitor whether countries
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meet their aforementioned commitments to adopting national policies and laws to facilitate the
return of looted Holocaust-era assets and aid the victims of these crimes. At the present moment,
the six primary tenets of the U.S. Policy on the restitution of Nazi-looted art are as follows:
1. A commitment to respect the finality of appropriate actions taken by foreign
nations to facilitate the internal restitution of plundered art
2. A pledge to identify Nazi-looted art that has not been restituted and to publicize
those artworks in order to facilitate the identification of pre-war owners and their
heirs
3. The encouragement of pre-war owners and their heirs to come forward and claim
art that has not been restituted
4. Concerted efforts to achieve expeditious, just, and fair outcomes when heirs claim
ownership to looted art
5. The encouragement of everyone, including public and private institutions, to
follow the Washington Principles
6. A recommendation that every effort be made to remedy the consequences of
forced sales
The United States, as the leading country in the development of post-war restitution
policies around the world, prides itself on deciding claims based on their merits, in an “ethical,
moral policy approach” with considerable efforts to achieve a “fair and just solution.” As
articulated by the State Department’s Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues in 2001 by
Ambassador Bindenagel, “the resolution of Nazi-era restitution and compensation matters…
should be handled through dialogue, negotiation and cooperation, rather than subject victims and
their families to the prolonged uncertainty and delay that accompany litigation.”54 This pride that
the United States boasts, however, can only be upheld if the courts deal with such claims in a
manner that adheres to federal policies and the previously established moral guidelines.
The patchwork of methods that victims of Holocaust-era plundering use to bring their
claims to court, the variety of players involved in settling such cases, along with the multitude of
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contrary laws and levels of legislation that must be considered, clarify the need for a more
simplistic way of addressing such cases. A more ideal and streamlined approach has yet to be
reached, despite the efforts made by the United States and foreign countries alike. Provisions
within foreign and domestic governments have been prescribed in an effort to refrain from
enforcing the state statutes of limitations. The question of whether time limits should be
preempted when considering these cases has become especially relevant as time has gone on and
cases continue to arise. This historical background serves to show why Nazi plundering and the
equitable return of victims’ property remains a challenging problem to resolve today. Cases that
the United States courts have decided confirm that efforts to return the property plundered during
the Holocaust is unfinished. With respect to confiscated art in particular, approximately 47
countries signed the aforementioned international pledges to uphold fair and just solutions but
have only partially adhered to these promises.
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Chapter 2.
Analysis of Relevant Cases within the United States Legal
System
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Rarely have cases of Nazi-looted art and the restitution of these works resulted in
settlement without resorting to litigation. The cases that have arisen in the United States courts
have featured “labyrinthine proceedings” and “labyrinthine arguments.”55 These terms have been
employed to describe the factual and legal intricacies that arise from claims containing mere
shreds of evidence from a war-torn Europe, resulting in jurisdictional and procedural
impediments that prolong the adjudication process.56 The passage of time and varying statutes of
limitations across the United States and other countries exacerbate “labyrinthine narratives” that
claimants must carefully construct when confronting the issues in a court setting. Despite the
passage of some legislation in recent years on the subject,57 the lack of a comprehensive
American statute to govern Nazi-era art restitution claims results in a never-ending patchwork of
laws at different levels of government and decision making on a case-by-case basis.
Under domestic law, the primary issues that come up most frequently include those of
statutes of limitations, equitable time limits, state restitution measures within the United States
itself, and federal restitution measures. International law additionally poses problems such as
foreign state immunity, the effect of foreign restitution proceedings, acts of state, and
international treaties. Lastly, conflicts of law related to determining the applicable substantive
laws to govern ownership disputes persistently complicate matters. Each country involved in
Nazi-looted art disputes tends to enforce different rules for determining the rights of original
owners and current possessors.58 Thus, a key question becomes, which country’s laws will
govern the case at hand? Factual uncertainties often plague the cases of Nazi-looted art, and
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substantive laws that courts may choose to apply need to be evaluated to determine their content
and applicability to the case at hand.
Landmark Cases: The Precedents They Set and the Rules They Created
Landmark cases in the field of Nazi-looted art set a precedent for the cases that followed,
but also serve to show how little progress has occurred when considering the starkly different
rulings that have been made in litigation. In considering these landmark cases, it is important to
keep in mind that every Nazi-looted art case consists of vastly different factors, details,
international components, and uncertainties of provenance among other complications. The
different avenues claimants can take in bringing these claims to court also create a lack of
uniform procedures for courts to follow, along with the different laws of various countries to
consider when the paintings have crossed international borders. Thus, there is no linear, clearly
defined way of adjudicating Nazi-looted art cases. We must then look for patterns in the cases to
follow and determine their similarities. Each case presents unique circumstances in which they
were brought to court, but the courts’ handling of them demonstrates a variety of shortcomings
as they attempt to adjudicate Nazi-looted art cases. The variety of issues involved in the
adjudication process is particularly pressing now since soon, there will be far fewer Holocaust
survivors to testify and provide first-hand accounts of who owned the works prior to Nazi
confiscation. As time goes on, we lose valuable witnesses, and thus a better approach or legal
template that adheres to the Washington Conference Principles must be created.
One particularly noteworthy landmark case that attracted considerable attention regarding
looted art was United States v. Portrait of Wally. This case acts as a prime example of the
labyrinthine proceedings that arise during the settlement of Nazi-looted art cases. This particular
case features complicated and multi-faceted legal questions in determining who should
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ultimately own the work of art. Prior to this case, only two restitution litigations had been filed
since 1990, those concerning Pablo Picasso’s Femme en Blanc (fig. 1) and Edgar Degas’s
Landscape with Smokestacks (fig. 2). These two cases concerned the role of customs in the
restitution of Nazi-looted art. The case of United States v. Portrait of Wally exemplifies the
impact of customs and forfeiture laws when dealing with restituting works. The painting, an oil
canvas by Egon Schiele, was stolen by the Nazis from a Jewish woman in 1939. Lea Bondi, an
Austrian Jew, and owner of the Würthle Gallery in Vienna acquired the painting prior to 1925.
Bondi’s gallery faced a bleak fate in March of 1938 when German troops began to occupy
Austria. With the German annexation of Austria, Jews were prohibited from owning businesses,
so naturally, Bondi’s gallery was subject to confiscation after its designation as “non-Aryan.”59

Figure 1. Pablo Picasso, Femme En Blanc, 1922, oil on canvas, 25 3/5 x 21 3/10 in 65 x 54 cm, 1922,
https://www.artsy.net/artwork/pablo-picasso-femme-en-blanc.
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Figure 2. Hilaire Germain Edgar Degas, Landscape with Smokestacks, 1893 1890, Pastel, over monotype, on textured cream wove
paper, edge-mounted on board, 317 × 416 mm, 1893 1890, https://www.artic.edu/artworks/151507/landscape-with-smokestacks.

Bondi was lucky enough to escape Austria for England, but before doing so, she sold her
gallery to Nazi art collector Friedrich Welz. Welz took an interest in Schiele’s Portrait of Wally
(fig. 3) when visiting Bondi’s gallery, and demanded the work be handed over to him, which
Bondi resisted. She argued it was part of her own private collection, never before part of the
gallery’s collection. Despite resistance to the taking of her property and due to her need to
escape, the work was handed over. At the end of the war, when the United States military forces
arrested Welz in Austria, the painting came into the possession of the United States government.
This work, along with others found, was then transferred to the Austrian government in
accordance with the policy and practice of the United States military to “return property seized
from Nazis to the governments of the countries of origin.”60 Wally was then delivered to the
Austrian National Gallery in Belvedere Palace, where it remained until Bondi asked Dr. Rudolph
60
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Leopold, an Austrian collector of Egon Schiele works, to recover the work for her in 1953.
However, Leopold instead entered an agreement with the Belvedere, which allowed him to
exchange a different Schiele painting from his own collection and keep Portrait of Wally for
himself. The fight for Wally between Leopold and Bondi continued up until the latter’s death in
1969.

Figure 3. Egon Schiele. 1912. Portrait of Wally. painting. Place: Leopold Museum.
https://library.artstor.org/asset/LESSING_ART_10310120005.

In 1994, Leopold’s art collection transformed into the Leopold Museum. The museum
loaned part of its Schiele collection to the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1997, and this
portion of the collection included Portrait of Wally. This action prompted United States
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Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV to issue a federal seizure warrant for Wally, based upon a
finding of probable cause that the painting was stolen property imported into the United States,
violating federal law.61 The United States then began a civil forfeiture action in order to return
Wally to Bondi’s estate, the painting's rightful owner. The United States Attorney’s Office for
the Southern District of New York argued that the importation and exportation of Wally in the
United States violated the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Thus, the office filed
a civil complaint in Manhattan federal court. During litigation, the Leopold Museum held that
Welz did not steal the work and that he was unaware that it constituted stolen property when it
was imported into the United States.62
In a historic decision, the Court rejected the argument that Wally was not stolen property
and decided it belonged to the Bondi Estate. The Court further ruled that Welz had stolen the
painting, and it remained stolen when it was imported into the United States. The remaining
matter to be settled was whether or not Leopold had known the work was stolen property, and
ultimately a settlement agreement was reached between the Government, the Bondi Estate, and
the Leopold Museum. It was determined that the Leopold Museum would pay the Bondi Estate
$19 million in exchange for Wally. The issue of civil forfeiture when it comes to property seized
during wartime is one of many to consider when Holocaust victims attempt to retrieve their
property, as was the case with Wally. Lea Bondi was never reunited with her painting since she
died before the case came to the attention of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York. Despite a certain degree of reckoning for the injustice committed by both
the Nazis and Leopold through financial compensation, Bondi herself was never reunited with
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her property.
This particular case, which was litigated over twelve years, became more dependent on
factual issues regarding the circumstances of Bondi’s loss of the painting than any other issues
that arose. Arguments made by the Leopold Museum regarding international treaties were
continually rejected in favor of the fact that Austria was not given exclusive jurisdiction over the
property like Wally.63 The Leopold Museum argued that the State Treaty of 1955, an
international agreement between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, and France,
established an independent civilian government for Austria, and Article 26 of the treaty obliged
the government to return property that “had been the subject of forced transfer or control on
account of the owner’s religion or racial origin.”64 The United States in this case had an interest
in enforcing laws that applied to the kinds of actions allowed within the country, including
trafficking laws. Choice of law, or the set of rules used in selecting which jurisdiction’s laws
apply in a suit, have come to dictate disputes of stolen art in that these cases more often than not
involve the crossing of national boundaries. The court states that the basis for the forfeiture
action taken was “the alleged importation of Wally into the United States in violation of the
National Stolen Property Act” which prohibits the “transportation of stolen or converted goods
into the United States.”65 This case is therefore an example of a federal court siding with United
States law and policy in an instance when Austria’s policy had to be considered as well.
The Wally litigation saw a shift in thinking when it came to handling claims regarding
Nazi-looted art, in that the Leopold Collection was held responsible for the stolen property in its
collection. In seizing the work from the MoMA collection, the U.S. government proved the
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seriousness of individual claims that are brought to court by individual people with emotional
and legal ties to works of art that were taken from them unlawfully. The handling of the case set
a precedent for Nazi-looted art cases going forward, demonstrating that even a world-renowned
art collection like MoMA’s was not exempt from the ethical and legal obligations that the case
presented. The Wally litigation also demonstrated the United States’ steadfast commitment to
adhering to the Washington Conference Principles that were intended to serve as a guide when in
dealing with such complicated cases. According to scholars like Howard N. Spiegler, the case
awakened “governments around the world, as well as museums, collectors, and others in the
global art community, to the problem of Nazi-looted art almost seventy years after the beginning
of the Nazi era in Europe.”66 The involvement of the U.S. government and its significance in the
case proved that the United States had public policy interests in seeing the case through despite
the lengthy litigation process. Since alternative dispute resolution is not always possible when
considering claims of this nature, and parties are often unwilling to participate in good faith as
the Leopold Museum was in the Wally case, the U.S. Government had to bring the “forfeiture
action to prevent the Leopold from sending the painting to Austria, thus placing it beyond the
reach of any plausible attempt at resolution.”67 This case, along with others to follow, further
illustrates the competing claims and the multiple, sometimes conflicting, laws that seem to
mitigate the courts’ abilities to consistently apply a uniform set of guidelines for dealing with
cases that present numerous unique questions. However, as we will see with the Grosz and
Cassirer litigation, the outcome is not always in favor of those who had their property taken
from them. This demonstrates inconsistencies in adherence to the Washington Conference
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Principles and the ongoing disputes involved in considering differing definitions of timeliness
and choice of law.
The second landmark case that should have defined the United States’ approach to Nazilooted art claims, but as we will see with the Grosz and Cassirer litigation did not necessarily do
so, was the Menzel v. List litigation. Erna Menzel’s restitution claim was the first of its kind in
the United States to receive such widespread attention, earning extensive media and legal
coverage. This extensive coverage resulted in international attention for the complicated web of
laws and claim-making process that came with this Nazi-looted art case; The New York Times
even referred to the case as a “classic legal domino game.”68 The painting in question was Marc
Chagall’s Le Paysan à L'échelle (fig. 4), owned by Erna Menzel in 1941. Menzel left the work in
her family’s apartment in Brussels when they fled the country. It fell into the hands of the
Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg (ERR), which was the Nazi Special Task Force that engaged
in the plunder of valuable cultural objects. One of the few uncontestable and agreed upon matters
when considering restitution cases is that any acquisition following the seizure of the work on
the part of the ERR was surely not made in good-faith, and the impossibility of this is
uncontested in restitution cases.69 In 1962, when Menzel discovered the location of her painting,
she demanded that the then-owner of the work, Albert List, return her rightful property, which he
refused to do. List argued that he acquired the Chagall through a good-faith purchase and that
Menzel’s claim was time-barred. The owner of the Pace Gallery on Madison Avenue in New
York, who oversaw the sale of the work, even testified when the case went to court, emphasizing
the standing of the renowned gallery and assuring the Court of Appeals that galleries of such
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standing only have to assume the “authenticity and good title” of the works they are
purchasing.70 Klaus Perls, owner of the Perls Gallery in New York, was brought in as a thirdparty defendant and tried before a jury. The litigation resulted in the jury returning a verdict in
Menzel’s favor, and the lower court ordered that the painting be returned to Menzel.

Figure 4. Marc Chagall, Jacob’s Ladder, oil on canvas, accessed May 5, 2022, https://www.jta.org/2020/01/23/culture/a-prized-marc-chagallpainting-was-stolen-in-the-90s-it-has-resurfaced-at-an-israeli-auction.

Menzel v. List has been referred to as “the leading New York state case” concerning the
application of the statute of limitations to stolen art claims.71 The primary question the court had
to answer was when the plaintiffs’ claim had accrued in order to determine when the statute of
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limitations was applicable. It was determined that Menzel’s claim accrued72 when List refused
their request that he return the painting, and not before. The case utilized the “demand and
refusal” rule under New York law, which was crucial in subsequent cases and requires that the
owner must prove that the bona fide purchaser has refused, upon demand, to recover the property
in question.73 This rule measures the accrual time of a cause of action and thus determines when
the statute of limitations “clock” has started running. New York courts, representing a leading
cultural center in the United States, began to require claimants to demand the return of an
artwork so as to extend the statute of limitations until after the possessor refused to return the
object in question.
Another rule that was created by courts in attempting to settle cases of stolen art has
come to be known as the “discovery rule.” Utilized in the courts of New Jersey and Indiana, the
discovery rule “tolls the running of the limitation period until the injured party, by the exercise of
due diligence, discovers or reasonably should have discovered the facts constituting the basis of
his claim.”74 Thus, the rule helped the courts to determine whether a claim was made during the
proper and appropriately applicable statute of limitations. The rule is supported by those who
believe investigators are more likely to discover necessary facts about the whereabouts of a piece
of stolen art, rather than other stolen property since art is so valuable and leaves a particularly
lasting impression upon those who come into contact with it. Proponents of the rule argue that it
focuses on the actions of the owner of the work, rather than the possessor, and thus protects
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innocent victims by allowing them to “retain title to their stolen property as long as they take
appropriate steps to recover it.”75 Ambiguity and variability in the term “appropriate steps”
create a labyrinthine approach as cases vary in fact-specific situations. Circumstances behind
each unique case of stolen art from the Holocaust cannot always be ascertained by the art owner,
for there is a large burden to bear in tracking down a work that could have crossed multiple
borders decades prior. Statutes of limitations are intended to mitigate the issues caused by the
passage of time, which can “make the prosecution of delayed claims burdensome and unfair.”76
However, different states and countries have different time frames that they adhere to when
considering statutes of limitations, and this creates more issues than the stipulations were
intended to solve. Thus, the lack of uniform rules creates obstacles for those making these sorts
of claims.
The courts’ decision to side with Erna during the Menzel litigation makes it an
enormously important landmark case. It clarifies the courts’ conception of the demand and
refusal rule and illustrates that courts maintain differing definitions of timeliness when it comes
to stolen art from World War II. The case also involved a sequence of events that could leave the
court to question whether or not the painting was purchased as stolen property. For the purchaser
was bona fide in his purchase following the events of the war, he was just unaware of the works’
stolen statue. Since time had passed and the painting had crossed borders since it left Menzel's
possession, the argument that the window of time to retrieve the work had closed was valid. The
length of time between when an object was stolen and when it was rediscovered should not be
factored into determining if said property should be returned or not. Stolen property remains
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stolen property despite the unavoidable passage of time. United States law, despite the victory
enjoyed by Menzel in this case, makes it difficult for claimants to prove that they are deserving
of retrieving their property once they discover that it was stolen and/or in the hands of someone
else.
Cases Where the United States Courts Failed
Three cases that did not adhere to Washington Conference Principles in the approaches
taken by the United States court systems include Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, Orkin v.
Taylor, and the more recently litigated Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation.
The Grosz litigation demonstrates complications that come with differing state statutes of
limitations, and thus, why time limits should not be imposed upon cases concerning Nazi-looted
art. The Orkin litigation similarly shows issues that arise in considering state statutes of
limitations, but also the unnecessary burden placed upon claimants to obtain information on the
works that were not undoubtedly or readily available, or nevertheless easily discoverable. The
case concerned reasonable expectations of the plaintiff’s diligence in obtaining evidence, but the
expectations themselves were, in fact, unreasonable. Lastly, the Cassirer litigation exemplifies
the issues that arise when considering Foreign State Immunity and the applicability of the FSIA,
an act that established “certain procedures that must be followed when suing a foreign sovereign
and attaching property for international debt recovery purposes.”77 The implications of this act
will be expanded upon in the following pages.
George Grosz was a German artist and leader of the New Objectivity and Dada
movements in Berlin during the Weimar period. He was an outspoken critic of the Nazis, and his
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work was deemed “degenerate” when Hitler rose to power. “Degenerate” was a term used to
suggest that the artists' mental, physical, and moral capacities were in decay and that the works
of art were the products of criminals that possessed mental and physical disabilities. In 1933,
Grosz fled his home country as Germany grew increasingly unsafe and made his home in the
United States. He lived in New York for the remainder of his life, but when he left Berlin, he left
behind many of his paintings with his friend and prominent Berlin art dealer Alfred Flechtheim.
Flechtheim was Jewish, and in 1933 he fled Germany himself for London. He brought some of
his inventory with him, but the rest was liquidated to pay off creditors. Flechtheim died in 1937,
and after his death, an Amsterdam art dealer whom he had trusted to deal with his collection
auctioned off many works, including two of Grosz’s paintings, Self-Portrait with Model from
1928 (fig. 5) and Republican Automatons from 1920 (fig. 6).

Figure 5. George Grosz, Self-Portrait with Model, 1928, Oil on canvas, 45 1/2 x 29 3/4" (115.6 x 75.6 cm), 1928,
https://www.moma.org/collection/works/79955.
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Figure 6. George Grosz, Republican Automatons, 1920, Watercolor and pencil on paper, 23 5/8 x 18 5/8" (60 x 47.3 cm), 1920,
https://www.moma.org/collection/works/34169.

Self-Portrait with Model was purchased by a third party and then sold to a collector in
Canada. Republican Automatons was purchased by the auctioneer and later resold to an
American collector. A third Grosz painting entitled The Poet Max Hermanne-Neisse with
Cognac from 1927 (fig. 7), which had been left in Berlin by Flechtheim, was stolen by a German
art historian when Flechteims’ assets were being liquidated after he fled Germany. The three
paintings ended up in the possession of the Museum of Modern Art in New York, and at this
point in time, the museum was aware of how many works were being sold because of the
“buying opportunities” Hitler had created.78 Despite this awareness, MoMA received SelfPortrait with Model as a gift in 1954 and bought Republican Automata from a Canadian
collector in 1946. The German possessor of The Poet Max Hermanne-Neisse with Cognac
claimed she inherited the work from Flechtheim and brought it to New York, where she hired
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Curt Valentin, previously an assistant to Flechtheim, to broker the sale of the painting to the
museum in 1952.

Figure 7. George Grosz, The Poet Max Herrmann-Neisse, 1927, oil on canvas, 23 3/8 x 29 1/8" (59.4 x 74 cm), 1927,
https://www.moma.org/collection/works/78619.

Grosz himself learned that his works were at MoMA in 1953, and upon learning this
information, expressed in a letter to his brother-in-law that they had, in fact, been stolen.
However, despite knowing they belonged to him, he felt there was nothing he could do to
reclaim his art, stating, “The Modern Museum exhibited a painting that was stolen from me (I am
powerless against that) they bought it from someone, who stole it.”79 Grosz then returned to
Germany in 1959 and died shortly afterwards without ever having sought restitution of his works
from the museum. The matter was not addressed for four decades.
In 2003, the director of the George Grosz Estate unearthed the unresolved matter and
contacted MoMA about acquiring the three paintings for the artists’ catalogue raisonné. After
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some exchange between the director of the museum, Glenn Lowry, and Grosz’s estate director,
the MoMA’s board of trustees denied the estate’s claims. They emphasized the lack of evidence
the estate brought forward, despite the fact that whether the paintings had been stolen or not had
been determined. Further, MoMA recommended against returning the paintings primarily
because Grosz never sought restitution of them while he was alive. They argued that because
Grosz could have raised the matter then, when the museum was in a better position to “ascertain
the works’ rightful ownership,” and to have possibly reached a settlement, it was unreasonable to
return to the matter after a fifty-year delay. The Grosz estate offered reasoning as to why the
artist did not pursue restitution while he was still alive in the 1950s, stating that Grosz was
“unwilling to make trouble in the country that had saved him from the Nazis,” and that he was
“reluctant to in any way assail or complain about the treatment he got from anybody in the
United States.”80
It was not until April 2009 that Grosz’s son Martin, together with his other son Peter’s
widowed wife filed a suit against MoMA in the federal district court of New York. They alleged
that The Poet Max Hermanne-Neisse with Cognac was stolen by the Berlin collector who
claimed to have inherited it from Flechtheim and that the other two works were stolen by the
Amsterdam dealer who sold them after his death. Concurrently, the heirs sought monetary
damages on common-law theories of conversion, or the intentional taking of personal property
without consent, replevin, the authorized retaking of property by its rightful owner, and
constructive trust, an equitable remedy imposed by a court, along with recovery of the
paintings.81 The museum contended that the suit was time-barred and moved to dismiss the
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complaint. MoMA relied on two arguments. The first is that according to provisions of German
and Dutch law, the action on the part of the heirs was untimely since Grosz had not done it
himself in the 1950s. Their second argument relied on the New York state statute of limitations,
and they held that the heirs waited too long to sue the museum after their request for the
paintings was denied in 2003 when the director of Grosz’s estate originally contacted the
museum about the matter. The museum further argued that in its July 2005 letter to the heirs,
they had clearly stated they believed to have legitimate title to the paintings, and that “under the
state statute of limitations, the heirs’ claim expired three years after they received the letter.”82
Because of the applicability of the New York statute of limitations, the district court granted the
museum’s motion to dismiss. The judges stated that the statute requires a property claim be
brought within three years of its accrual and that a “demand and refusal” rule applied. Thus, the
claim accrued when the buyer (MoMA) refused the owner’s demand to return the property, and
the July 2005 correspondence, in this case, constituted the refusal. According to the court, the
statute of limitations had run out in July 2008 and rejected the heirs’ argument that it should be
suspended for the period of negotiations that occurred between July 2005 and the museum’s last
letter in April 2006.83 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals then affirmed the judgment of
dismissal, agreeing with the lower court that the museum’s refusal took place in July 2005, and
thus the statute of limitations had run out by the time the heirs filed the suit. The Supreme Court
denied review of the case in 2011.
The court may have chosen to side with the museum was because of its perception of the
equities in this case.84 The dismissal and language of the district court’s opinion, in order to
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avoid lengthy litigation, suggests that those involved believed the museum should keep the
paintings. The museum’s argument relied on the less straightforward nature of how the paintings
left Grosz’s possession, asserting that they were not looted by the Nazis, and were instead
consigned to his dealer by his own choice. The museum even asserted that the plaintiffs relied on
“general, conclusory innuendo-and on headline-catching accusations whose only purpose is to
invoke the powerful but wholly irrelevant specter of the Holocaust.”85 The wording in the
defendants’ description of the complaint issued by the heirs also frames the heirs as persistent to
a fault, without sufficient reason to act as such. The museum relied heavily on the fifty-year
delay in the heirs filing the claim, arguing that this made any meaningful evidence unobtainable.
They contended that since Grosz and Flechtheim were dead at the time the claim was brought
forward, and since they were the “two individuals most likely to know the true facts,”86 the court
was deprived of the necessary facts needed to decide the case. In a letter from 2005 from the
museum’s director to the director of Grosz’s estate, the court acknowledged, however, that the
director used “‘temporizing language’ indicating the museum’s willingness to continue
investigating and negotiating the matter.’”87 The museum director suggested that MoMA may
one day be open to negotiating an agreement with the plaintiffs and even perhaps handing over
one of the works. This temporizing language could have been weighted more heavily by the
court if they had not favored the decision to allow the museum to keep the paintings.
The Grosz heirs’ argument that the running statute of limitations should be tolled, or
suspended, on equitable grounds, took into account the nine months between the July 2005 letter
from the museum director and the April 2006 letter indicating that the museum board had
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rejected their claims. Because of the temporizing language that the museum director employed in
the first letter, the heirs were under the impression that the museum was actively considering
returning the paintings. The director also indicated that upon referring the matter to the board of
the museum, they had engaged a former attorney general to investigate, and thus the plaintiffs
argued they were under the impression the matter was still under investigation. They asserted
that because of the museum’s language they understood that their demand had not been refused,
and thus based their argument on equitable estoppel.88 89 Despite this, the court considered this
argument “utterly unpersuasive” since “equitable tolling90 ‘applies only in the rare and
exceptional circumstance’ where a plaintiff has ‘acted with reasonable diligence throughout the
period he seeks to toll…’” and that the Grosz heirs’ case did not constitute a rare circumstance.91
The court believed that the museum stated that they sought the assistance of a former attorney
general not because they were actively considering returning the works, but rather to ensure they
were assessing the situation independently and responsibly. They further concluded that the
January 2006 letter indicated that litigation was warranted because the museum had repeatedly
suggested they would not be returning the paintings. Under New York law, the doctrine of
equitable estoppel only applies in specific circumstances, including “where plaintiff was induced
by fraud, misrepresentations or deception from filing a timely action” and that the fact that
settlement discussions were ongoing did not warrant equitable tolling of the statute of
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limitations.92 The three works still remain part of MoMA’s permanent collection.
The court’s decision in this case, arguably, violated the 1998 Washington Conference
Principles on Nazi-Confiscated art, in that the principles relied on international agreements rather
than written consequences. The principles implored the participating nations to decide claims
based on their substance, not technicalities like the statute of limitations. However, the
agreement was non-binding in nature and thus could not have the same influence. The guidelines
set forth by the American Alliance of Museums, which also clarified the moral duty of museums
to return works that were expropriated during wartime, were considered by the courts as “not
intended to create legal obligations or mandatory rules.”93 Instead, these guidelines were
intended to “facilitate the ability of museums to act ethically and legally as stewards’ through
‘serious efforts on a ‘case by case basis... and should not be interpreted to place an undue burden
on the museums.”94 The Grosz case also demonstrates and clearly illustrates the issues that
imposed time limits can create when the adjudication process requires the reconstruction of an
accurate historical account, a problem that will continue to grow as we lose more and more
Holocaust survivors as time goes on.
The Orkin v. Taylor litigation begins with the prominent Jewish arts patron Margarete
Mauthner. Mauthner was an early enthusiast of van Gogh and bought many of the artists’ works
immediately following his death. She began collecting van Gogh’s paintings before he was
considered a master, and she purchased his Vue de l’Asile et de la Chapelle de Saint-Rémy from
the Cassirer gallery in Berlin in 1907 (fig. 8). When Mauthner fled Nazi Germany in 1939 with
her family, she left the work behind, and it remains unclear as to what happened to the work
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during this period. Despite this ambiguity, the 1939 catalogue raisonné95 of van Gogh’s work
lists Mauthner as the painting’s owner, and the 1970 edition listed the owner as Jewish
businessman Alfred Wolf, who fled Germany for Switzerland in 1934.96 Wolf then
commissioned Sotheby’s in London to sell the work at auction in 1963, during which actress
Elizabeth Taylor purchased it for £92,000. Taylor then put the work up for auction at Christie’s
in London in 1990. However, it did not sell, so it remained in her Los Angeles home.

Figure 8. Vincnet van Gogh, Vue de l’Asile et de La Chapelle de Saint-Rémy, 1907, oil on canvas, 1907,
https://www.christies.com/features/From-the-outside-in-Van-Goghs-Vue-de-lasile-et-de-la-Chapelle-de-Saint-Remy-8961-3.aspx.

Over a decade later, Mauthner’s great-grandchildren reached out to Taylor to tell her they
were the rightful owners of the van Gogh piece. Their reasoning lay in the fact that Mauthner
was labeled as the work’s owner in the 1939 catalogue raisonné, and that it was not with her in
South Africa, where she and her family fled to at the time. The paintings’ whereabouts were
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unaccounted for after she fled Germany, and the great-grandchildren argued that she “parted with
the painting involuntarily as a result of Nazi persecution.”97 Taylor’s lawyers refused the
demand, and because of the actress’s wide-reaching fame, the matter received considerable press
coverage. This made the case a hot topic of conversation, increasing awareness of the issues
involved in litigating these cases.
Another detail to keep in mind in considering these cases is the potential moral issues that
time constraints may pose. The heirs of the van Gogh painting were asked why they waited to
request that Taylor return the painting, and in addition to not knowing that Mauthner owned it at
one point, Andrew Orkin, one of the three great-grandchildren, stated that “I knew the family had
owned works of art that hadn’t come to South Africa. But we didn’t talk about it. Our way of
dealing with the Holocaust was total silence.”98 The family had not been ready to face the facts
of what had happened during this time of great adversity and thus had not considered searching
for their missing property or looking into what happened to their great-grandmother’s art
collection. This way of dealing with grief after an event as heinous as the Holocaust, although
inconvenient and problematic when considering statutes of limitations and court-mandated time
constraints, is unpreventable, for one cannot tell a victim of genocide, whether it be direct or
indirect, how to react to such a tragedy. One cannot mandate acceptable forms of grieving or
punish people for how they grieve the effects of a massacre that left generational trauma. The
Orkin's chosen way of dealing with tragedy should not mean they cannot later seek to reclaim
what once was theirs.
Despite this, after the Mauthner heirs filed a suit against Taylor in October 2004 in
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federal district court in Los Angeles, the district court granted Taylor’s motion to dismiss the
case. Their complaint argued that the Taylor family did not properly investigate the painting’s
provenance before purchasing it and “ignored warning signs that it had been stolen or sold under
duress.”99 Their claims were based on the common law and California state legislation, but the
court ruled that the common law claims were barred by California’s three-year statute of
limitations. The court ruled that since Taylor’s purchase of the painting was heavily covered by
the media, their claims must have accrued around this time because of reasonable diligence, and
thus, the statute of limitations on the common law claims had expired. The court of appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed that the state law claims were time-barred since the heirs either knew
or “should have known” about the works at the time of Taylor’s purchase. The court stated that
“the heirs should have discovered the existence of their claim by 1990 at the latest, when Taylor
advertised it for sale at an internationally-known auction house.”100 The district court also
rejected the heirs' federal claims, under which they maintained that they held an implied private
right of action independent of state law. The district court ruled that the statutes the plaintiffs
invoked did not create an independent private right of action for property claims. Subsequently,
the court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the federal statute they relied on, the
Holocaust Victims Redress Act of 1998, was precative, or an advisory suggestion that does not
have the force of a demand or a request which under the law must be obeyed. The act, according
to the court, did not “create individual rights or, for that matter, any enforceable law.”101
Following these decisions, the Supreme Court then refused to hear the case.
The claims that were based on California state law, as determined by the courts, were
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again, barred by the state statute of limitations. California courts had determined in tort cases not
involving state property, that “an action accrues on the date of injury…” and “upon the
occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action.”102 However, this stance was
determined to be troublesome and demanding in considering cases that involved a delay between
the time of injury and its discovery by the plaintiff. To remedy this, the court replaced the rule
with the aforementioned discovery rule to give the plaintiff more time to bring their claim
forward. The California supreme court later asserted that the discovery rule meant a claim
accrued when the plaintiff became aware of its factual basis. Being “aware” referred not only to
what the plaintiff had to realize, “but also to what, under the circumstances, she ought to
realize.”103 All of this led the court of appeals to assert that the Orkin should have known about
their claim against Taylor prior to the time they brought the suit. It was held that the Orkin's
should have investigated sooner, should have been more proactive, and should have moved more
quickly. This expectation on the part of the courts is in conflict, yet again, with Washington
Conference Principles, and seems to favor the defendants in the case.
Additional, seemingly insurmountable, and labyrinthine problems posed by restitution
claims regarding Nazi-looted art include multiple foreign states and, often, as a result, choice of
law. Claims against foreign governments, which can arise when a government-sponsored art
museum is in possession of a looted work, raise the question of whether the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 applies retroactively to “lift foreign states' immunity for events that
occurred in the 1930s and 1940s.”104 The act was intended to define the jurisdiction of the United
States courts in suits against foreign states, the circumstances under which foreign states are
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considered immune from suit, and when execution should not be imposed on their property or for
other purposes.105 Generally, in its early years, the FSIA barred federal courts from maintaining
jurisdiction over foreign states unless the claims met certain exceptions. In 2016, an amendment
was made to the FSIA’s expropriation exception, which permitted claims “‘in which rights in
property taken in violation of international law are in issue,’ as long as that property, or the entity
that owns it, is connected to commercial activity taking place in the United States.”106 The 2016
bill, signed into law by President Barack Obama, narrowed the expropriation exception to supply
a greater degree of immunity for foreign states in sending works of art to the United States for
temporary exhibitions. The amendment considers that this loaning of artwork for exhibition, and
any related activities, does not constitute the kind of “commercial activity” barred by the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act.
When dealing with multiple levels of government and governments of different countries,
a persistent issue arises when determining the applicable substantive law to govern ownership
disputes. As we have seen in the aforementioned cases, the works of art went through auctions
and were sold in different countries over long periods of time, and each country has its own rules
for determining the original ownership rights and rights of current possessors. Thus, one must
determine which country’s rule should be applied, and this decision then determines the heirs’
right to retake the work in question. In considering Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, a case that is
still pending today, we now shift to examining the restitution of Nazi-looted art as an
international matter that transcends the borders of just the United States and has implications for
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the country’s foreign affairs and other country’s own agendas.
Julius Cassirer owned a Berlin art gallery that was known to champion French
impressionist works. In 1900, Cassirer came to own Camille Pissarro’s 1897 work Rue SaintHonoré, après-midi, effet de pluie (fig. 9). When Cassirer died in 1924, he left the work to his
daughter-in-law Lilly. Lilly emigrated from Germany with her husband in 1939, and since she
was Jewish, ran into a great deal of trouble in obtaining a German exit visa. In order to secure a
visa, she had to surrender the Pissarro work to a Munich art dealer who had been hired by the
Nazis to appraise the Cassirer’s’ belongings.107

Figure 9. Camille Pissarro, Rue St.-Honore, Apres-Midi, Effet de Pluie, 1897, oil on canvas, 1897, https://itsartlaw.org/2019/06/12/case-reviewcassirer-v-thyssen-bornemisza-collection-foundation/.
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The painting was traded and sold numerous times after falling into the hands of the
Munich art dealer, Jakob Scheiderwimmer. Scheiderwimmer traded the work to a fellow dealer,
who brought it to the Netherlands. Following the German invasion, the work was then sold to an
anonymous buyer in 1943. It was then smuggled to the United States in 1951 and subsequently
sold to a Missouri collector then again to a Swiss collector in 1976. This collector, Hans Heinrich
Thyssen-Bornemisza, sold the work in 1993 to the government of Spain. The Spanish
government purchased the work to add to their Pissarro collection, as they recently created a
museum named in the collectors’ honor.108 Following the war and her return to Germany, Lilly
Cassirer filed a claim for restitution against Scheiderwimmer and the German government. Since
she was unable to determine the work’s whereabouts after she had handed it over to
Scheiderwimmer, she settled the claim in 1958. She received a payment of compensation and
died in 1962.
In 2000, four decades after Lilly’s settlement was reached, her grandson Claude Cassirer
was made aware that the Pissarro was on display at the Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum in Madrid.
During the war, Claude escaped from an internment camp in Europe and emigrated to the United
States, so discovering that his rightful property, which he inherited from his grandmother, hung
on the walls of a museum named after “the family that bankrolled Hitler”109 caused him great
anguish. He requested that Spain’s culture minister see to it that the painting be returned, but his
request was refused. Following this refusal, several members of the U.S. Congress and American
diplomats made subsequent requests on Cassirer’s behalf, all of which were also refused. Thus,
Cassirer took the matter to court in 2010 and filed a suit in Los Angeles federal court. Cassirer
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asserted that the advertising and marketing strategies Spain and the museum engaged in,
featuring the Pissarro painting in these materials, constituted commercial activities in the United
States, and thus, that the Los Angeles court could assert jurisdiction over the defendants. The
Kingdom of Spain and Thyssen-Bornemisza Museum filed a motion to dismiss on various
grounds, including foreign state immunity.110 The district court and court of appeals for the Ninth
Circuit both denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and both upheld that neither defendant
earned immunity. In accordance with the FSIA, immunity was lifted because the claim involved
recovering property that was expropriated in violation of international law. As stated by the
district court, the FSIA “requires only that property was seized in violation of international law,
not that the foreign sovereign itself violated international law.”111
In 2010, Claude Cassirer died and left his children the responsibility of taking over the
case. His children dropped the Kingdom of Spain to pursue the case with only the ThyssenBornemisza Foundation as the defendant. Two years later, the district court dismissed the case,
holding that it was time-barred under California’s three-year statute of limitations.112 A pivotal
question in the case then became that of choice of law. The court had to decide whether to apply
California law or Spanish law. Under Spanish law, the museum could have acquired the painting
in good faith, since valid title to personal property is awarded if the purchaser possesses it openly
for six years, as the museum did. However, under California law, if the property was stolen and
then sold, even if it was sold in good faith, the property does not retain good title. The Erie
doctrine, established in 1938, states that in analogous situations, federal courts should choose
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which state’s law to apply by looking at state choice-of-law doctrines.113 The Ninth Circuit,
however, applied a federal common law doctrine regarding choice of law, and the district court
ruled that Spanish law applied. Federal choice-of-law principles in the past, as held by the Ninth
Circuit, have followed the receipts of the Second Restatement of Conflicts which was developed
by the American Law Institute in the 1960s. The district court in the Cassirer litigation based
their analysis of the case on this source, which set forth a general choice-of-law principle
applicable to interests in both real and personal property. The restatement states that “the interest
of the parties in a thing is determined depending upon the circumstances, either by the law or by
the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant
relationship to the thing and the parties.”114 In accordance with the restatement’s approach, the
court concluded that under federal common law, Spanish law governed the Foundation’s claim
that it acquired ownership of the painting by “adverse possession.”115
Another interesting aspect of this case arises when considering the defendants’ argument
that the Nazi seizure of the painting did not violate international law and the district courts’
reasoning for rejecting this argument. In the Altmann decision, the court of appeals recognized
that in order to “fall into [the expropriation exception of the Act], the plaintiff cannot be a citizen
of the defendant country at the time of expropriation, because expropriation by a sovereign state
of its own nationals does not implicate settled principles of international law.”116 The plaintiffs
argued that Lilly Cassirer was not a German citizen at the time the painting was taken, since Nazi
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citizenship laws stated that Jews were not citizens of the Reich.117 The court concluded that since
she was not considered a German citizen by the German government at the time, the
expropriation exception still stood. Subsequently, the defendants argued that the expropriation
exception could not be used against Spain, since the exception created “jurisdiction only for suits
against ‘the foreign state that expropriated the property,’ and not for suits ‘against some later
purchaser who was not complicit in the taking.’”118 For the first time in dealing with Nazi-looted
art cases, the court was faced with deciding whether the FSIA’s expropriation exception applied
to states that had later possession of the property, and was not merely confined to the state that
carried out the unlawful taking. The court held that the “plain language of the statute”119 did not
require Spain to be the entity that expropriated the painting in violation of international law. The
court pointed to the fact that the section was written in the passive voice, and thus “focuses on an
event that occurs without respect to a specific actor.”120
An additional issue posed by this case is revealed when looking at California's
amendment to the statute of limitations. In 2010, the California legislature extended the statute of
limitations to six years instead of three when considering claims having to do with the recovery
of lost art that was unlawfully taken or stolen. The claims had to be against galleries and
museums, and the amendment specified that they could only accrue when the claimant has
“actual knowledge of the lost art’s location,” Consequently, “galleries and museums could not
invoke the rule of constructive recovery.” The rule of constructive recovery stipulates that the
claim may be time-barred if the claimant failed to learn or could have been expected to know the
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whereabouts of the work.121 The amended statute, as indicated by the legislature, was intended to
“ease the burdens facing claimants to missing art as a result of limitations periods…” while also
“encouraging responsible behavior on the part of museums and galleries.”122 Despite these good
intentions, the statute of limitations was only extended by three years, and in cases of Nazilooted art restitution, the cases span multiple decades.
The Thyssen-Bornemisza Foundation argued that the 2010 amendments did not even
apply, due to a preemption from the doctrine of foreign affairs. Under this doctrine, it had been
decided by the court of appeals that Holocaust restitution policy was “‘for the federal
government alone to address” and thus that “‘California may not improve upon or add to the
resolution of the war.’”123 Despite the statute not explicitly mentioning Holocaust-era thefts, the
district court concluded that it was too similar to the previously overturned statute and
“‘impermissibly intrudes on foreign affairs because its aim is to provide a remedy for wartime
wrongs through California courts that would otherwise not exist.’”124 However, the court of
appeals felt the statute addressed the pre-existing claims and was unrelated to foreign affairs
since it did not require the claims to arise out of wartime injuries or “other specific sources that
might implicate the federal government’s foreign affairs power.’”125
In May of 2021, Cassirer petitioned the Supreme Court for review in the case following
the Ninth Circuit’s affirmation of the district court’s holding that the Thyssen-Bornemisza
Collection Foundation did not know that the painting was stolen property when it made its
purchase. Spain is a signatory to both the Terezin Declaration and the Washington Conference
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Principles, and again, despite the fact that neither of these documents presents a legally binding
obligation, the moral sentiment is intended to encourage the country to act in a way that
supported the return of plundered works to their rightful owners. It should be noted that Spain
did not act in accordance with the principle throughout the duration of the Cassirer litigation,
instead fighting to maintain ownership of the work despite awareness of its questionable
provenance. Stuart E. Eizenstat, the drafter of the Washington Conference Principles and State
Department advisor on Holocaust issues, used Spain as an example in the Cassirer case as one of
the few countries that “‘have made virtually no effort to comply.’”126 This resistance to giving up
artistic treasures that have come into the collections of certain museums is not uncommon and
must be remedied or even punished in order to adhere to the moral principles that the
Washington Conference sought to instill across the globe. Countries must be held to this standard
through either positive reinforcement or legal obligation, otherwise, they are permitted to
seemingly agree with the principles as signatories to the agreement, and then act contrary to them
when cases arise. Despite the court rulings that the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection acted on the
basis of its rights under Spanish law, the country had a certain moral obligation to adhere to the
aforementioned principles and release its claim on the work. Contrary to the Republic of Austria
v. Altmann litigation a case in which the United States courts demonstrated adherence to the
Washington Conference Principles, the Cassirer courts ruled in favor of allowing Spain to enjoy
sovereign immunity. Spain failed to abide by its obligations, both with respect to Washington
Conference Principles and the return law for Jewish people. The law, passed in 2015, granted
descendants of Sephardic Jews who were expelled from the country in 1492 “fast-track dual
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citizenship rights as a modern measure to atone for historic wrongs committed against Jewish
communities.”127 There are not only inconsistencies in the United States’ application of laws in
deciding cases concerning Nazi-looted art, but also in the participating country’s stances
concerning when works should be returned to rightful owners.
Despite the seemingly bleak outcome, these proceedings implied early on for the
Cassirers, their luck has since changed. In a unanimous decision made by the United States
Supreme Court on April 21, 2022, the case was remanded to court in California for further
proceedings. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the opinion, which stated that the heirs should not
have anticipated a federal common law rule to choose if Spain or California’s law would apply in
adjudicating the claim.128 The Supreme Court Justices all agreed that California’s choice of law
rule applied, and that in this particular case, the FSIA did not apply. They thus rejected the Ninth
Circuit’s federal common law approach to choice of law in FSIA cases.129 This decision now
suggests that the heirs will attempt to nullify the federal district court’s finding that Spain’s law
decides the claim, despite falling under California’s choice of law rule.130 This decision suggests
a bright future for restitution in the United States, for, under Spanish law, the defendants would
be allowed to keep the stolen property, while under California law the original owners could
triumph.
An Instance of Justice in the United States Courts
Arguably, one of the most famous cases concerning Nazi-looted art is Republic of Austria
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v. Altmann. The case has received extensive national coverage, ranging from multiple books
written on it to a multi-million-dollar film, and proves that the United States courts are capable
of delivering justice to Holocaust victims and victims of Nazi-looting despite the aforementioned
instances of them failing to do so. The Altmann case revolved around Gustav Klimt’s Portrait of
Adele Bloch-Bauer I from 1907 (fig. 10). Klimt was commissioned to paint this portrait of a
Jewish member of the Viennese social and intellectual elite. The Bloch-Bauer family was famous
for its patronage of modern art in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and their
ownership of a sizable and extremely valuable collection of paintings. Adele herself exemplified
the importance of Jewish patronage during the Golden Era of fin-de-siècle Vienna, and she was a
well-known philanthropist, socialite, and patron of the arts during her lifetime.

Figure 10. Gustav Klimt, Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I, 1907, oil and gold leaf on canvas, 140 cm x 140 cm, 1907,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portrait_of_Adele_Bloch-Bauer_I.

Adele died in 1925, and her will stipulated that the portrait, along with five other Klimt
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paintings in her possession, be donated by her husband, Ferdinand Bloch, to the Austrian Gallery
Belvedere. However, when her will went through probate, the court determined that the paintings
were not hers to donate, for they were her husband’s property. Ferdinand left his possessions,
including Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I, to his two nieces and nephew in a will he wrote
before his death in 1945. He had fled to Switzerland in 1938, after which Nazi officials seized
the extensive art collection he had amassed in Austria. The Nazis sold hundreds of items and
took several of the works for Göring and Hitler’s own private collections.131 The SS lawyer in
charge of liquidating Bloch’s estate, Erich Führer, came in possession of the Blochs’ Klimt
collection and, in 1941, handed over the Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I to the Belvedere.
Ferdinand’s heirs asked the Belvedere to return the Klimts after the war, but the gallery
refused. The gallery claimed that it received the works from the pre-war bequest written in
Adele’s will. Maria Altmann, the niece of Adele and Ferdinand and heir to the Klimt paintings,
was under the impression that the works were rightfully donated to the state and Belvedere
gallery before the war. She herself had fled Austria in 1938 for the United States and resided in
Los Angeles. Altman took action to retrieve the paintings left to her only after the publication of
a 1998 exposé by investigative journalist Hubertus Czernin, who revealed that the Austrian
museum’s collection featured many stolen works that were forcefully extorted from Jewish
families both during and after the war (including the Klimt works. She filed a claim with the
restitution committee in Vienna, in hopes of retrieving the six Klimt paintings in the Belvedere
collection, but the committee declined her request. The committee argued that Adele’s will
“created a binding legal obligation for Ferdinand to bequeath the paintings to the Belvedere in
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his own will.”132 In response to this, Altmann filed suit in the Austrian courts in 1999. However,
Austrian law required that she post a bond of roughly $1.6 million in order to pursue the case.
She requested a waiver, and the court reduced her bond to $135,000, an amount equivalent to all
of her liquid assets. It was economically impossible for Altmann to pursue the case in Austria, so
she returned to the United States and filed suit against the Republic of Austria in federal court in
Los Angeles a year later.
Her claim sought the return of the six Klimt paintings under the 1998 Austrian restitution
law, under international law, and under common law. Because the Belvedere Gallery engaged in
commercial activity in the United States, including marketing museum guidebooks that displayed
Portrait of Adele Bloch-Bauer I on their covers along with previous instances of loaning the
painting to American museums, she was able to pursue the case in American courts. Austria
moved to dismiss the action, contending that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity. The
district court, however, ruled that the FSIA could be applied retroactively. In addition, the court
determined that Austria was stripped of the immunity provided by the FSIA because of their
commercial engagement in the country the suit was filed in. Foreign sovereign immunity in
American law became a matter of “‘grace and comity’ in furtherance of sound foreign
relations.”133 Until the 1950s, foreign states received a rule of absolute immunity in American
courts because the State Department “‘followed a policy of requesting immunity in all actions
against friendly sovereigns.’”134 However, the Tate Letter, published in 1952, changed the
American approach. Then-Acting U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Jack B. Tate wrote this
letter to the then-Acting Attorney General, advocating for a more restrictive theory of sovereign
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immunity. The letter stated that the Government had a responsibility to “undo the forced
transfers and restitute identifiable property to the victims of Nazi persecution wrongfully
deprived of such property.” The letter also stated “that the policy of the Executive, with respect
to claims, asserted in the United States for restitution of such property, is to relieve American
courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
acts of Nazi officials.”135 The letter was considered an important policy shift, moving away from
the United States’ previous, more absolute theory of sovereign immunity that recognized
immunity with regard to public acts of a state but not with regard to private acts.136
Despite this movement in the right direction, the policy was difficult to implement.
Political considerations and diplomatic pressures led to instances of the State Department
granting immunity to foreign nations in cases that were not covered by the restrictive theory. The
Supreme Court observed that “the governing standards were neither clear nor uniformly
applied.”137 In order to combat these issues, Congress enacted the FSIA in 1976. In applying the
FSIA during the Altmann litigation, the issue became the temporal reach of the act, rather than
whether the case met the requirements for an expropriation exception. There was disagreement
on the former topic, but the courts eventually rejected Austria’s contention that the act only
applied to events occurring after 1952, when the restrictive theory of immunity was first adopted
by the Department of State. However, each court rejected this argument for three different
reasons. The District Court ruled that the FSIA was a jurisdictional statute, and thus could be
applied to all cases adjudicated after their enactment “without regard to when the underlying
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conduct occurred.”138 The Court of Appeals ruled that the State Department’s pre-1952 policy on
immunity granted such immunity “‘in all actions against friendly foreign sovereigns’”139 but in
Altmann’s case, the foreign sovereign that confiscated her property had, until recently, been
considered an enemy. The court also referenced the Tate Letters’ statement on the Department’s
dedication to remedying the wrongs victims of Nazi persecution experienced.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ approach, arguing that it
conflicted with the mission of the FSIA to depoliticize immunity determinations. The Supreme
Court also argued that the District Court’s argument oversimplified the issue in labeling the
FSIA a jurisdictional statute, stating that the act “defies such categorization.”140 The Supreme
Court held that Congress intended the FSIA to apply to pre-enactment conduct, and as proof, the
court referenced the statement’s preamble that foreign states’ immunity “‘claims should
henceforth be decided by American courts… in conformity with the principles set forth in this
chapter.” The Court stated this meant that Congress intended courts to “resolve all such claims
‘in conformity with FSIA principles’ regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred.”141
The Supreme Court ruled that Altmann maintained the right to pursue her claims in
federal court in June 2004. Her case was remanded to the district court, and in November 2005,
the parties submitted the dispute to binding arbitration in Austria. Altmann at this point was
already eighty-nine years old, and she wanted to expedite the decision process. The panel granted
Altmann five of the six claims made during the litigation. The sixth painting in question was not
proven as stolen and thus was to remain in the Belvedere Gallery. Today, Portrait of Adele
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Bloch-Bauer is on display at the Neue Galerie in New York City. Altmann sold the piece to the
gallery’s owner, Ronald Lauder, for $135 million in 2006. This case was particularly significant
in that the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
applied retroactively.
Conclusion
The aforementioned cases all serve to show the labyrinthine proceedings involved in
litigating Nazi-looted art claims. Primary issues, that are in some sense interconnected, include
those of different statutes of limitations and mitigating issues posed by participating foreign
states. Menzel v. List and Portrait of Wally were similarly painted in the media as legally
confounding, with increasingly complicated backstories that served to confuse litigators
regarding the actual whereabouts of the works at issue in these cases. Choice-of-law continues to
confuse courts in deciding which countries’ rules should dictate how cases proceed, and because
of all of these complicated considerations, cases get drawn out, sometimes even for decades.
Thus, a solution to mitigate these issues, along with changing the non-binding nature of the
Terezin Declaration and Washington Conference Principles, should be prioritized in order to
avoid continued difficulties and injustices for victims of Nazi looting.
Those who seek restitution of their property, which is often missing from their possession
since the beginning of World War II, must go through a lengthy, inconsistent process of
adjudication just to bring their claims to court. The process is further thwarted when the cases are
litigated in the United States courts due to a variety of factors. In some cases, as with Cassirer,
Orkin, and Wally litigations, original owners die before the cases are concluded, and thus there
may not be any living witness to the events able to litigate. Heirs might then be put in charge of
litigation, and often, there are no cases in which an international matter is not present. All of
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these cases have certain aspects in common, including that each case of litigation has to do with
how the works were passed down from one person to another. Following this chain of ownership
requires far more clear-cut laws in place of the grab-bag of legal guidance that currently plagues
the United States courts. We currently do not have an adequate legal superstructure or template
to sufficiently provide these victims of plunder justice. Because there are so many factors and a
high degree of uncertainty involved in these cases, including ongoing disputes about what
timeliness even means, we cannot make definitive conclusions about what must be done to
improve the current state of laws. However, there is an inexcusable lack of effort to better the
process for victims of plunder, and this grows ever more concerning as more World War II
witnesses die and therefore cannot testify in legal proceedings.
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In considering possible avenues of amending the judicial process concerning Nazi-looted
art claims, it is necessary to take into account the progress that has been made in recent years. It
is also necessary to keep in mind the multitude of parties and challenges involved in both settling
and bringing claims to light. Maintaining a balance between the interests of the victims of looting
and the museums or collections is necessary, but increasingly difficult. Self-imposed ethical
guidelines like the Terezin Declaration and Washington Conference Principles are also not
enough to ensure justice is delivered, for as we have seen, they are rarely followed by countries
and institutions, and remain unenforceable. Legal scholar Katharine Skinner referred to U.S.
federal action to resolve the issue of Nazi-looted art restitution as “aspirational rather than
practical,”142 criticizing the U.S. courts for being ill-equipped to handle the unique problems
presented in the Nazi-looted art cases.
Proposals to solve the aforementioned issues have arisen within the past decade, ranging
from a proposed federal statute of limitations, financial compensation or a new system for
displaying the provenance of works in collections, a federal ban on harsh statutes of limitations,
civil forfeiture, and international arbitration panels.143 Because of the varying conclusions, courts
tend to reach in adhering to a grab-bag of laws to dictate their decisions, rarely are the outcomes
just for all parties. To combat this, Skinner also proposed legislative action rather than judicial
action, calling for the formation of an Advisory Commission that requires the federal
government to take a substantive role, with Congress passing legislation “that removes
impediments to the identification and restitution of Holocaust victims’ assets.”144 This idea was
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echoed by key players involved with Nazi-art restitution beginning in 2010. Officials involved in
the drafting of the Terezin Declaration discussed creating a U.S. State Department Commission
to handle Nazi-art restitution claims, but there are questions about whether this commission
would be binding in nature. This Commission was proposed to resolve factually complicated
cases by “balancing equitable factors such as: (1) how much research the museum put into the
artwork's provenance when the museum first acquired the piece; (2) whether the artwork's
provenance has gaps to suggest a period of unknown and possibly illegal ownership; and (3)
what sort of plans the museum has for the piece (i.e., will it be on display or stored away).145 The
Commission would also include a sunset provision, or a clause within the statute that sets its
expiration on a specific date, in this case, ten years, in order to provide repose146 for museums.
The ten-year period would allegedly allow “ample” time to generate publicity for the claims, and
as a result, would motivate others to bring forth their own claims.147 However, this dependency
on publicity to ensure claimants bring up Nazi-art restitution cases in a still restrictive time frame
of ten years is unreliable. Although the proposed Commission is promising in its emphasis on
considering gaps in the known provenance of a work, its pitfalls outweigh its strengths. It does
not allow for enough time to gather information and does not take into consideration the fact that
not all information on the works’ whereabouts, along with a multitude of other factors, are easily
discoverable for the heirs.
A number of moral and ethical questions must also be answered to appropriately
determine the best way to resolve Nazi-art restitution claims. Additionally, models of
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adjudication or legislative settlement that are dependent on restrictive time frames must be
completely rejected, for time is one of the greatest opponents in the effort to restore justice to
victims of Nazi looting. Moral rights and property rights come head-to-head in issues of
restitution, and often the question of morality leads us back to the Washington Conference
Principles of 1998. Emphasis is also placed on the desire to determine a “fair and just
resolution,” or to determine the strength of a party’s moral claim to the property. Competing
rights of heirs to recover what once was theirs must also be balanced with the rights of museums
or public institutions to display works of art and maintain their access to the larger population.
Art historian, lawyer, and art crime specialist Erin Thompson posed the critical question of
whether or not the moral responsibility of museums to display these works of art to the public
trumps the right of the heir in trying to regain their property. In arguing that the moral
responsibility of museums to display works of art outweighs the rights of the original possessor
to regain their title to the work, one must assume that open access to art, which museums provide
for the public, is a moral responsibility that competes with the moral responsibility of restitution
of stolen property.148
Katharine N. Skinner, with other legal scholars, argues that courts in the United States are
ill-equipped to handle Nazi-looted art cases in part because there is an absence of clear precedent
on the issue. However, this is not always the case, as we have seen in the previous chapter. There
are many precedential cases for courts to rely upon in moving forward with Nazi-looted art
claims, and many of these cases demonstrate the flawed way in which the courts have handled
some claims. For example, museums are very reluctant to restitute an artwork without “absolute”
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certainty of its illegal provenance, for they could suffer a great loss if they were to lose a piece
from their collection. Courts often then apply varying standards with unjust and differing rules,
that make it difficult for claimants to meet such high expectations.149 Skinner’s approach may be
appropriate in considering claims made against museums or other public institutions, but one
must also take into consideration the cases in which claims are brought against individuals or
private entities like galleries.
Additionally, it’s important to consider whether it is reasonable to expect that the general
public could discover that a work in a museum’s collection was stolen by the Nazis at some point
during World War II and if this fact is accessible to the public. Sometimes, previously plundered
works are stored deep within the museum’s collection and are not on public display, or their
provenance is unknown even to the museum. One might think that with the increasing
digitization of archives, provenance databases, and other crucial records, individuals would have
an easier time bringing claims to court. In a recent case, Alsdorf v. Bennington, neither the heirs
nor the holder of a Picasso painting were aware of its history as a Nazi-looted work. Rather, an
online organization that maintains a database of stolen art created in 1990 called the Art Loss
Register revealed the painting’s history to the heirs. The heirs, as a result, filed a claim against
the then-possessor of the work.150 The increase in digitization of museum records and access to
information regarding the provenance of works makes for an increased number of restitution
cases filed, and thus those who argue that these cases will eventually lose their urgency, or their
prominence, are mistaken. As more technological resources designed to discover historical
records and provenance become available, more claims will become evident to heirs and the
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current possessors of the pieces.
The way in which the Alsdorf litigation came to the courts was unique, as each Nazilooted art claim tends to come to the courts in unpredictable ways. Heirs must prove their legal
standing in order to bring the claims to court, which are often treated as ordinary replevin151
actions for the return of stolen property.152 Only if heirs have located the current holder of a work
and can additionally prove their family’s past ownership of a work, can they then initiate a
replevin action, which allows the claimant to repossess the stolen personal property. Difficulties
will continue to arise as the time period between now and World War II continues to lengthen.
The once primary heirs who may have actually seen the artwork during their lifetimes, or who
could provide first-hand knowledge of the works’ whereabouts, continue to die off and dwindle
in numbers, making the information available in each case less reliable. As primary heirs then
die off, the next generation of heirs often take over the cases, and they often lack the family
government records, photos, or other documents, like insurance policies, to prove their legal
entitlement to the property in question. In these cases, the court will award the claimant the right
to the artwork only if they prove their ownership, their right to possession, and detention of the
property by the defendant. The claimant must additionally prove that a demand for return was
made by the plaintiff and that there was a subsequent refusal by the defendant.153 At times,
however, courts have applied an alternative legal rule, known as used conversion,154 instead of
replevin when handling Nazi-looted art cases, making for an even more confusing and arbitrary
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process. In utilizing the theory of conversion, the plaintiff must prove their right to possess the
property at the time of conversion, prove the defendant’s wrongful act in depriving the plaintiff
of this right, and provide proof of damages. Only then can they “recover the monetary value of
the claimed artwork instead of the return of the work itself.”155 As we have seen, the statutes of
limitations pose problems for claims treated with both theories of replevin and of conversion
because of the many obstacles claimants face as they attempt to bring a case to court. The sheer
number of requirements further exacerbates the already restrictive time frame claimants have to
gather enough information.
Abolishing Time Restraints and Amending the HEAR Act of 2016
Time restraints on property claims have presented those in the legal field with numerous
questions for many years. The passage of time allows for a certain degree of uncertainty in
applying legal rules, and one cannot confront any legal issue without considering the passage of
time, the length of the interval between cause and effect, and where we can fill in the gaps
regarding the sequence of events at hand. The passage of time can “create pressures, both public
and private, to take steps to ensure that legal rights and duties do not depend on events that are
remote from the present, either past or future.”156
When considering the usefulness of varying state statutes of limitations when handling
Nazi-looted art cases, many claimants will face a lose-lose situation. In the United States,
statutes of limitations for property tend to be three years in length, but state legislatures are
allowed to adjust their statutes of limitations for bringing a suit to court. It is important to also
note that most European countries on personal properties and claims for art stolen in the
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Holocaust have far longer statutes of limitations than does the United States They do not allow
for exceptions like discovery or toll, as the United States does.157 In 2002 California, for
example, entirely eliminated the statute of limitations for bringing suit “as long as the action was
brought on or before the end of 2010.”158 While this change would have made for an easier
process for heirs and other claimants to undertake when attempting to regain their lawful
property, the state courts deemed the statute unconstitutional. As a result of this, a new solution
had to be reached, and thus “section 338(c) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, was
enacted to extend the statute of limitations from three to six years for claims for recovery of fine
art from a dealer, gallery, auction house or museum, commencing upon the discovery of both the
identity of the possessor and the location of the work.”159 In 2016, a uniform, federal statute of
limitations was established for claims regarding stolen artwork or recovery of objects stolen by
the Nazis, which will be discussed below. The federal statute of limitations, like the compromise
in California, extends the statute of limitations from three to six years. Unfortunately, extension
is not nearly enough time to calculate how many years have passed between the actual looting of
the work and the initiation of a claim. Federal law also clearly controls state decisions regarding
their own statutes of limitations for common law claims, despite there being no federal statute of
limitations until very recently. An important preemptive question is whether a federal statute of
limitations over all state law causes of action may violate the Tenth Amendment because it
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“purports to preempt state causes of action on a purely procedural basis.”160 This preemption
could thus interfere with state rights. Additionally, the issues regarding the constitutionality of
California attempting to completely abolish the state statute of limitations are related to the
attempt to make “special” rules to apply to Holocaust-era looted art. This attempt to make
Holocaust-specific rules for cases of stolen property has been ill-received, but as we have seen,
these cases pose incredibly unique and intricate problems that are deserving of alterations to allencompassing, more general rules.
Some critics argue that statutes of limitations constitute “an avoidance of substance”
problem when considering Nazi-looted art cases. Ronald Lauder, former U.S. ambassador to
Austria, president of the World Jewish Congress, former honorary chair of the board of the
Museum of Modern Art in New York, and founder of the Neue Galerie museum in New York,
asserted that “there are museums here in the United States that have been waiting out the clock to
pass the Statute of Limitations…” He further argues that this method of prolonging cases “forces
claimants to spend enormous amounts of money on legal fees,”161 eventually causing them to
give up their cases altogether. Differing statutes of limitations thus allow museums and
defendants in cases an opportunity to stall resolution, and in the case of Nazi-looted art, this
usually means stalling to wait for the plaintiff to die before resolution or a fair and just solution
can be reached.
In New York, state law requires that the good-faith purchaser of a work prove that it was
not stolen. Additionally, if a claimant discovers facts that give rise to a claim, they have six years
as well to bring that claim to court. The statute of limitations in this state does not begin to run
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until the then-possessor of the artwork refuses the demand of the claimant for return. The
problem with this approach lies in the fact that the courts might have different definitions of a
refusal, as we saw with the Grosz litigation, which was discussed in Chapter 2. In this particular
case, the museum was not required to provide an explicit statement in order to constitute a
refusal. A court can merely imply a refusal if a museum’s actions “‘clearly conveys an intent to
interfere with the demander's possession or use of his property.’”162 This approach must be
changed, and demand must adhere to certain standards in the court so as to avoid confusion
among party members in considering a case. This would ensure a step toward ensuring that a
“fair and just” solution can be reached, as was emphasized in the Washington Conference
Principles. Fair and just solutions were intended to “bridge the gap” between differing legal
perspectives that can arise when considering cases like these that cross international borders. If
claimants are under the impression that their demand has not been refused, because of a
miscommunication and subtle refusal on the part of the possessor, then fairness cannot possibly
be achieved. Additionally, most of the art in question is understood to be somewhere in Europe,
and often in European museums that are internationally renowned. This means that the museums
often involved in these cases are in countries where the law forbids the deaccessioning of art
from national collections.163 Because of the sheer physical distance between the heirs and their
stolen property, since the former tend to have fled from their home countries in Europe to the
United States, time considerations seem to work against claimants. Thus, time constraints also
work against the Washington Conference Principles, which were supposed to establish a
favorable outcome for victims of looting. Additionally, one must consider the interstate nature of
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the art market and Congress’s ability to override state law statutes of limitations. President of the
Commission for Art Recovery Anes Peresztegi and International Director of Restitution at
Christie’s Monica Dugot eloquently stated that since 1943, U.S. policy has emphasized
supporting restitution, but the country’s actions have not proven this.
The December 2016 HEAR Act, signed into law by President Obama, preempted all state
statutes of limitations with respect to claims for Nazi-looted art. Senator Charles Grassley,
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that the act’s purpose is to “ensure that laws
governing claims to Nazi-confiscated art and other property further United States policy as set
forth in the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscate Art, the Holocaust Victims
Redress Act, and the Terezin Declaration…” He also noted that the three prior agreements were
intended to “ensure that claims to artwork and other property stolen or misappropriated by the
Nazis are not unfairly barred by statutes of limitations but are resolved in a just and fair
manner.”164 Although the aforementioned sentiments seem to align with the goals of the
Washington Conference Principles, the HEAR Act is a compromise that still qualifies as lip
service. Despite its apparent success in providing a certain degree of uniformity in determining
which statute of limitations should apply and where it should begin, several issues remain
unresolved. These include difficulties for claimants regarding proof, records lacking
transparency, pressure on heirs to determine whether or not they have a case, and questions of
what qualifies as a “good faith” purchase. The act is an incomplete solution, and the six-year
statute of limitations does not provide heirs with enough time given the unique circumstances
posed by Nazi-looted art cases. The challenges involved in tracking down a piece of art, most
likely traded across international borders over the span of decades, cannot fully be resolved at a
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brisk pace.
Perhaps one of the most relevant shortcomings of the HEAR Act is the doctrine of laches
provision, which bars a claim upon the defense “showing that the claimant unreasonably delayed
in bringing suit and that the delay caused the artwork’s possessor to suffer prejudice.”165 Nazilooted art claims are unavoidably delayed because of the time that has passed between World
War II and the present. In addition, possessors can show prejudice based on lost evidence, which
occurs when witnesses die. Laches also, by nature, relates to the passage of time and determines
the point at which a claimant should no longer be allowed to commence a suit.166 A laches
defense allows the possibility that a victim may not be able to recover his or her property, and
thus the HEAR Act’s failure to prohibit laches defenses potentially leads to outcomes
inconsistent with The Washington Conference Principles. The doctrine of laches also allows the
current possessor of the work to avoid litigating on the merits of the case. Since a central goal of
the HEAR Act is to ensure that Nazi-looted art cases are litigated based on merit, the allowance
of the doctrine of laches prevents this goal from being accomplished. Often too, in deciding
when there has been an unreasonable delay in making a claim, courts do not consider the
circumstances unique to victims of the Holocaust and World War II. Possessors of artworks are
too easily able to meet the burden to prove prejudice, for all a defendant must do to meet this
burden is demonstrate “that an individual who may have been able to comment on earlier
transactions is unavailable.”167 This requirement thus becomes increasingly easier to meet with
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the passage of time as more Holocaust victims and direct heirs to the artworks die off. The
HEAR Act thus, in its inclusion of laches, does not accomplish its primary goal of furthering the
policies set forth by the Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscate Art, the
Holocaust Victims Redress Act, and the Terezin Declaration.
Solutions
In order to combat the glaring obstacles posed by statutes of limitations and mitigate the
shortcomings of the HEAR Act, which provides a step in the right direction but only an
incomplete solution, time restraints must be abolished entirely with respect to Nazi-looted art
claims and laches defenses must be prohibited. Courts do not adequately scrutinize a possessor’s
investigation into whether the artwork was acquired through good faith or not, and thus the
typical assessment of a laches defense does not accomplish a fair and just solution. The
foundations of American property law establish that “a thief can never convey good title,”168 and
yet, in property disputes involving works of art, dealers must merely demonstrate “honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”169 This
language suggests that substantial duty of diligence is not imposed on the art market and that the
purchaser of the work only has to “lack subjective knowledge that the artwork was stolen in
order to qualify as a ‘good faith’ purchaser.”170 The art market seems to traditionally turn a blind
eye to illegally acquired works because it is in the interest of the dealers or auction houses to
maintain a degree of secrecy to maximize profits, escape negative publicity, avoid taxation on
transfer, or protect the work of art in question from a claim that could “cloud its title.”171 Turning
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a blind eye is not entirely possible when considering works of art stolen during World War II, for
the mass looting that defined the period was well known to the entire art market since it
occurred. Turning a blind eye to the morally questionable practices of the art market and courts,
which in fact have a moral obligation to victims of Holocaust-era looting, is becoming more
difficult because of the internet, publicity surrounding instances of looting, and precedential
cases. However, it is still possible, and that is a primary issue in considering how best to proceed.
Courts should enact stricter legislative action in determining whether or not a piece was
acquired in good faith. Provenance investigations throughout the country, whether they are
conducted by museums, auction houses, or private galleries, should be far more comprehensive
and thorough. If any work of art was in Europe between the years of 1933 and 1945, it should
automatically be considered in a different category than other artworks. This is a common
practice in some institutions. For example, Sotheby’s auction house founded its restitution
department in 1997, making the organization the first of its kind to dedicate an entire division to
this area of research. If a work comes into Sotheby’s possession that was in Europe between
1933 and 1945, cataloguers are required to request it be further examined by the restitution
department in order to determine if it was posted as looted on one of their many databases as
looted. If a work came from Germany, Austria, or Belgium in 1933, Switzerland in 1941, Eastern
Europe in the late 1930s, or France in 1940, cataloguers are instructed to refer the work to the
restitution department. Auction houses and individuals that were active in dealing looted art,
including Rudolph Lepke, Hugo Helbing, Hans Lange, Karl Haberstock, and Alex Vömel, are
also flagged, along with looting businesses and names like Flechtheim and Goudstikker.
Additionally, an Art Loss Registry (ALR) must commence after discovering the paintings’
whereabouts, so as to further confirm the origins of the work and determine if it was acquired in
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good faith.172 An ALR consists of a required form containing basic cataloging information, along
with any additional provenance information, instances of the work in any literature, exhibition
history, and further research about the work one may know. This information is then crosschecked with the auction houses’ databases to see if it has been recorded already. The
department, after conducting these reviews of ownership records for works being considered for
sale, facilitates “mediations between sellers and legal heirs that bring restituted works to public
auction.”173 The Sotheby’s restitution department examines every work that is valued at
approximately $80,000 or higher. This indicates that despite the auction house’s comprehensive
measures to prevent morally questionable practices when it comes to Nazi-looted works, their
motivations are still primarily monetary in nature. Incentives for museums, auction houses, and
galleries to follow Washington Conference Principles, as previously mentioned, lack teeth, and
often these institutions choose the path that yields the greatest financial reward. In order for these
aforementioned efforts to yield real results and not merely serve as ethical guidelines, instituting
more demanding requirements to meet the standard of good faith prior to allowing the
possibility, if even, to assert a laches defense.
United States Senator John Cornyn, in drafting the HEAR Act, described the bill as “an
important and symbolic step to reclaiming not just artwork, but familial legacy.”174 He referred
to the promises made to and the moral responsibility of restituting works of art as a sacred duty,
for just as these are objects of physical property, often worth a considerable amount of money,
they also serve as reminders of the violence and persecution the original owners endured. The
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statute of limitations in these cases serves to promote fairness to the current possessor of the
work since, after the limitations period, his or her right to the disputed property outweighs the
claimant’s right to bring a challenge.175 Additionally, the doctrine of laches allows possessors to
prevail more easily and makes it more difficult for claimants to recover artwork based on the
merits of their cases, conflicting with the primary purpose of the Washington Conference
Principle. Statutes of limitations must be extended past a still restrictive time frame of six years,
and the doctrine of laches must either be removed entirely or restricted in order to meet the
HEAR Act’s original intentions.
Policy Proposal: Creating a Forward-Thinking, Enforceable International Agreement and
Initiative
As with any international initiative, one country must take the lead. As a global leader,
the United States must first standardize its own laws to replace the current patchwork of varying
rules from state to state regarding Nazi-looted art, and all art stolen during periods of war. First,
standardization of law must be accomplished. Changes must be made to abolish the doctrine of
laches as well as alter the rhetoric of the HEAR Act. Only then can the United States work
cooperatively with other nations to form a core group. This core group must agree to binding
international laws and guidelines that would function as an international criminal court to handle
all restitution cases. Cases should also be handled in the plaintiff’s country of residence so as to
avoid issues involving choice of law. This particular requirement must be established early on in
the process of forming the international laws and guidelines that govern the core group.
Even if only a few selected countries initially agree, ideally including the United States,
the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, and Austria, the group can gradually add other
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nations as NATO has done over the years.176 These countries must reference previously agreedupon principles, such as those provided by the Washington Conference Principles and Terezin
Declaration, in their initial discussions to determine the appropriate laws that will guide the
group. Principles and laws must also be guided by the aforementioned landmark cases in order to
determine the laws that would best govern this proposed initiative. Specific laws and guidelines
that should govern this international initiative include:
1. Eliminating any statutes of limitations on crimes committed during war against
property as well as against people. Personal property as well as communal, like
museums, churches, and monuments, would fall under the property category.
2. Countries that take part in this cooperative international agreement must
contribute funds to assist plaintiffs in the prosecution of these cases if the plaintiff
cannot afford it on their own. This stipulation would adhere to the Washington
Conference Principles in its steadfast guarantee that all victims of Nazi looting
have an equal opportunity to regain what was once lawfully theirs. This approach
would mitigate the challenges and alternative avenues that some countries take by
forcing the plaintiffs to pursue cases in unaffordable, foreign courts.
The issues illustrated when examining Nazi-looted art pertain to art and objects stolen from
people and countries through the ages. The same principles and moral framework used when
considering these World War II cases can be applied to cases involving African art, antiquities
from Ancient Greece and Rome, Native American art, and even today with all the art being lost
in Ukraine to Russian forces. Thus, although the issue of Nazi-looted art is particularly timesensitive since first-hand witnesses are very old, the same values, laws, and guidelines should
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govern how countries handle other issues of restitution when it comes to property lost during
times of war.
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Conclusion
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The concept of restitution is intrinsically ethical, for one’s possessions define one’s
identity, history, and status. Nazi looting during World War II infringed upon the most basic of
human rights, stripping so many of their dignity and leaving their distant family members to pick
up the pieces of their shattered lives. Without clear guidance from global leaders on how to best
ensure victims of these horrible war-time tragedies are justly compensated for their losses, the
physical and emotional scars from World War II will remain. Priceless works of art that once
hung with dignity in the homes of Jewish families were picked off the walls by individuals who
had no title to do so. Decades later, some of these works have suffered complete destruction,
while others remain hidden, lost, or illegally displayed in museums, private collections in private
homes, or put up for auction.
Previous litigation regarding Nazi-looted art cases proves that there are currently many
shortcomings within the United States legal system for dealing with such cases. Despite
commendable international efforts to establish a number of principles for countries to follow
when faced with World War II-era asset repatriation cases, a lack of uniformity and
understanding between countries and even within the countries themselves exacerbates a number
of other questions that arise in these complicated situations. Unresolved questions include choice
of law, differing statutes of limitations, information on the whereabouts of works of art, and
maintaining international relations.
Certain landmark cases set a positive precedent, like Wally and Menzel v. List, but these
precedents are not always followed. Washington Conference Principles, which are non-binding
in nature, need to be made binding in order to deliver justice to victims. The actual consequences
for those who seek restitution are profound and far-reaching, and competing claims along with
the multiple, often conflicting laws that can be applied in any given case seem to mitigate against
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consistent outcomes. The cases discussed in Chapter 2 were adjudicated in different ways
because there are so many different opportunities for claimants to raise these issues. In some
cases, there is ample knowledge about the whereabouts of a work of art, while in others there is
only one person alive who can testify to where the work was in a certain time frame. In most
cases, it matters where the case began geographically, and there is no single case that has not
featured an international component. All litigation of Nazi-looted art involves ascertaining how
the works are passed from one person to another, and after following this chain of events, we
must determine the state of the law. Because of this plethora of obstacles, all of which have not
even been touched upon in this thesis, the incomplete solutions that have arisen in the time since
World War II are insufficient. Because there are so many different avenues to take, there is so
much uncertainty, and there are fewer Holocaust survivors with every passing day who can
testify to the actual events that transpired. a lack of a uniform set of procedures and differing
laws will ensure that justice is not provided. Given the urgent need to provide, proper restitution
to Holocaust era victims and their heirs, it is time to establish a uniform set of laws and
procedures so that their claims can be properly adjudicated.
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